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1Project Description
The use of light water at supercritical pressures as the coolant in a nuclear reactor offers the potential 
for considerable plant simplification and consequent capital and O&M cost reduction compared with 
current light water reactor (LWR) designs.  Also, given the thermodynamic conditions of the coolant at 
the core outlet (i.e. temperature and pressure beyond the water critical point), very high thermal
efficiencies of the power conversion cycle are possible (i.e. up to about 45%).  Because no change of 
phase occurs in the core, the need for steam separators and dryers as well as for BWR-type re-circulation
pumps is eliminated, which, for a given reactor power, results in a substantially shorter reactor vessel and 
smaller containment building than the current BWRs.  Furthermore, in a direct cycle the steam generators 
are not needed.
If no additional moderator is added to the fuel rod lattice, it is possible to attain fast neutron energy 
spectrum conditions in a supercritical water-cooled reactor (SCWR).  This type of core can make use of 
either fertile or fertile -free fuel and retain a hard spectrum to effectively burn plutonium and minor 
actinides from LWR spent fuel while efficiently generating electricity.  One can also add moderation and 
design a thermal spectrum SCWR that can also burn actinides.  The Generation IV Roadmap effort has 
identified the thermal spectrum SCWR (followed by the fast spectrum SCWR) as one of the advanced 
concepts that should be developed for future use.  Therefore, the work in this NERI project is addressing 
both types of SCWRs.
This reactor concept presents several technical challenges.  The most important are listed below.
1) Fuel and Reactor Core Designs:
- Local or total coolant voiding in the fast-spectrum SCWRs increases leakage, but hardens the 
neutron energy spectrum and decreases parasitic absorption.  The net effect can be a reactivity 
increase.  The core must be designed to ensure that the overall reactivity coefficient is negative.
- The thermal-spectrum SCWRs require additional moderation, water rods can be used but one has 
difficult design problems to control the heat transfer from the coolant to the moderator rods, 
especially during off-normal and accident situations.  A solid moderator would be better.
- A low conversion ratio fuel rapidly loses reactivity with burnup, thus requiring a large excess 
reactivity at beginning-of-life to operate continuously for an acceptably long time.  Therefore, a 
control system must be designed that safely compensates for reactivity changes throughout the 
irradiation cycle, or the spectrum must be hardened to increase the conversion ratio.
- The Doppler feedback in the fast-spectrum SCWRs will be much smaller than that found in 
typical LWRs.
2) Fuel Cladding and Structural Material Corrosion and Stress Corrosion Cracking: 
- Because of the oxidizing nature of high temperature water, corrosion and stress corrosion
cracking of the fuel cladding and core internals materials are expected to be major concerns for 
this reactor concept.
- Radiolysis of the water coolant in the fast-spectrum SCWRs may take place at a higher rate than 
in traditional LWRs.  In addition, the radicals formed by the radiolytic decomposition of the 
water (both fast and thermal versions) are highly soluble in supercritical water and may not 
recombine as well as in an LWR.
- The hard neutron spectrum in the fast-spectrum SCWRs makes the irradiation damage of the fuel 
cladding and core structural materials more pronounced than in traditional LWRs.  Also, high-
energy neutrons work as catalysts for the oxidation and stress corrosion cracking of the structural 
materials (irradiation assisted stress corrosion cracking).
23) Plant Engineering and Reactor Safety Analysis:
- Depending on its mission (e.g. electricity generation, co-generation of steam and electricity, 
desalinization), the plant will exhibit different optimal configurations and operating conditions.
- Because no change of phase occurs in the reactor vessel, the need for a pressurizer to maintain the 
operating pressure has to be assessed.
- The implications of utilizing supercritical water on the design of the reactor containment need to 
be evaluated.
- Because of the significant coolant density variation along the core, the supercritical water reactor 
might be susceptible to coupled neutronic/thermal-hydraulic instabilities.
- The response of the plant to design and anticipated accidents and transients might differ
significantly from that of LWRs and needs to be evaluated.
- The relative benefits of direct versus indirect cycle reactor coolant system designs need to be 
assessed.
The project is organized into three tasks, reflecting the three technical challenges above.
Task 1. Fuel-cycle Neutronic Analysis and Reactor Core Design (INEEL).  For the fast-spectrum
SCWR, metallic, oxide, and nitride fertile fuels will be investigated to evaluate the void and Doppler 
reactivity coefficients, actinide burn rate, and reactivity swing throughout the irradiation cycle.  Although
metallic alloy fuels are incompatible with the water coolant, we envision the use of a dispersion type of 
metallic fuel, which will be compatible with water.  Included in the fertile options will be the use of 
thorium.  The main variables are the core geometry (e.g. fuel rod length, pitch-to-diameter ratio, assembly 
configuration) and the fuel composition.  For the thermal-spectrum SCWR, a variety of fuel and 
moderator types will be assessed.  The MCNP code will be utilized for instantaneous reactivity
calculations and the MOCUP code for burnup calculations and isotopic content.
Task 2. Fuel Cladding and Structural Material Corrosion and Stress Corrosion Cracking 
(University of Michigan and MIT).  The existing data base on the corrosion and stress-corrosion
cracking of austenitic stainless steel and nickel-based alloys in supercritical water is very sparse.
Therefore, the focus of this work will be corrosion and stress corrosion cracking testing of candidate fuel 
cladding and structural materials.  In Year 1 of the project MIT will use an existing supercritical-water
loop to conduct initial corrosion experiments on a first set of candidate alloys in flowing supercritical 
water, and will identify promising candidate alloys classes for core internal components and fuel cladding 
based on existing data on the alloys radiation stability and resistance to both corrosion and stress-
corrosion cracking.  A high temperature autoclave containing a constant rate mechanical test device will 
be built in Year 1 and operated in Years 2 and 3 at the University of Michigan.  The resulting data will be 
used to identify promising materials and develop appropriate corrosion and stress corrosion cracking 
correlations.
Task 3. Plant Engineering and Reactor Safety Analysis (Westinghouse and INEEL). The
optimal configuration of the power conversion cycle will be identified as a function of the plant mission 
(e.g. pure electricity generator, co-generation plant, hydrogen generator).  Particular emphasis will be 
given to the applicability of current supercritical fossil-fired plant technology and experience to a direct-
cycle nuclear system.  A steady-state sub-channel analysis of the reactor core will be undertaken with the 
goal of establishing power limits and safety margins under normal operating conditions.  Also, the reactor 
susceptibility to coupled neutronic/thermal-hydraulic oscillations will be evaluated.  The response of the 
plant to accident situations and anticipated transients without scram will be assessed.  In particular the 
following transients and accidents will be analyzed: start-up, shut-down, load change and load rejection; 
LOCAs and LOFAs.  As part of this analysis, a suitable containment design will be explored to mitigate 
the consequences of LOCA accidents.
3Task 1 Results: Assessment of Solid Moderators for Thermal 
Spectrum SCWRs (INEEL)
1.1.  Summary of Previous Work
During the 1st quarter, a qualitative analysis was performed to determine which fuel form would 
support the highest reactivity-limited burnup in a fast-spectrum SCWR, and would have the most 
proliferation resistant isotopics at a particular burnup.  A relatively long core life and a modest reactivity 
swing are possible in fast-spectrum SCWRs with most fuels.  However, the uranium-based fuel types had
the highest beginning-of-life reactivity, and the best reactivity-limited burnup, whereas the thorium-based
fuels had the best spent-fuel isotopics.  Therefore, the most appropriate fuel for fast-spectrum SCWRs 
appears to be a mixture of thorium and uranium to balance long core life with proliferation resistant 
isotopics.
The small effective delayed neutron fraction (βeff) associated with fast-spectrum reactors can make 
reactor control problematic, especially for fuels that contain large quantities of minor actinides.  To help 
overcome this challenge, and remain within the current knowledge of thermal spectrum reactor control,
work was started during Quarter 2 to assess the design of a thermal-spectrum SCWR.  In order to
thermalize the neutron spectrum in a supercritical pressure water reactor, one can increase the pin pitch or 
introduce moderator rods to increase the moderator to fuel ratio.  While increasing the pin pitch would be 
the simplest approach, the large hydraulic diameter would result in very low coolant velocities and
unacceptable cladding temperatures.  Therefore, one must employ moderator rods or cans and initial
calculations were performed to verify the moderating power of several different moderators including 
H2O, D2O, graphite (C), BeO, and ZrH2.  This work was continued in the 3
rd Quarter as discussed below.
1.2.  Introduction
The characteristics of supercritical water that most affect the thermal-hydraulic and neutronic design 
of a thermal-spectrum supercritical-water-cooled reactor (SCWR) core are the large enthalpy rise and the 
low average density.  Typical values for the enthalpy rise and density drop along the axis of a SCWR core 
are shown in Figures 1 and 2.
Tin/Tout: 280/450°C
Cosine Power Profile
Tin/Tout: 280/450°C
Cosine Power Profile
Figure 1. Typical enthalpy rise in the SCWR core. Figure 2. Typical coolant density drop in the SCWR 
core.
4Note that the enthalpy rise is about an order of magnitude larger than for an LWR.  Correspondingly, 
for given thermal power, the core flow rate is an order of magnitude smaller.  This requires that the core 
flow area (i.e., the coolant-to-fuel ratio) be considerably reduced compared with an LWR, to maintain 
high coolant velocities and ensure proper cooling of the fuel.  However, the low coolant-to-fuel ratio, 
combined with the low average coolant density, makes it impossible to design a thermal-spectrum core 
without the addition of a dedicated moderator.
In Japan, where the SCWR concept has been studied for over a decade, this issue has been addressed 
by the introduction of water rods into the fuel assemblies [Okano et al. 1994].  More recently a similar 
approach has been adopted in Europe as well [Cheng et al. 2002].  The water-rod concept is based on the 
coolant flow path illustrated in Figure 3.  The feedwater flow splits into two streams, one of which is 
directed to the lower plenum at the bottom 
of the reactor pressure vessel (RPV), the 
other is directed to cool the RPV upper
head, from where it flows downward into 
water filled moderator rods and through 
the core, mixes with the other feedwater 
stream in the lower plenum, flows back up 
into the core as coolant and finally goes to 
the turbine.  This flow path is necessary to
prevent a significant reduction of the
outlet core temperature by mixing hot
coolant with cold moderator in the upper 
plenum.  Although it was demonstrated
that this approach does provide adequate 
moderation, its practical realization relies 
on complicated plumbing extending above 
the core to convey the moderator from the 
RPV upper head to the water filled
moderator rods in the fuel assemblies.
Further, the moderator coolant piping
above the core may make refueling more 
cumbersome.
Therefore, we have evaluated
alternative solutions in an effort to
simplify the RPV internals and attain
some capital cost savings.  The use of a 
solid moderator in lieu of water rods
deserves attention, as it would eliminate 
the need for the involved coolant flow path within the RPV and the associated plumbing.  Other
advantages of this approach include a reduction of the coolant worth and an increase of the core thermal 
capacity, both of which might result in significant safety improvements.
Obviously, if the technical feasibility of the solid moderator approach is demonstrated, its ultimate 
selection or rejection will be determined mostly by an economic trade-off.  It will be necessary to
establish if the savings from elimination of the water filled moderator rod plumbing justifies the cost 
increase deriving from the use of more expensive materials for moderation in the core.  Assessment of 
such trade-off is beyond the scope of this study at this point in time.  However, a rough estimate of the 
Figure 3.  Flow path in the SCWR with water rods (from 
Ishiwatari et al., 2002).
5impact of using a solid moderator on the electricity production costs of a SCWR is presented in Section 
3.7.
1.2.  Neutronics
In this section the neutronic performance of 6 moderators is assessed (some of this information was 
presented last Quarter).  The moderators are: water rods, zirconium hydride (ZrH1.6), Be, BeO, C, SiC.
(The choice of ZrH1.6 instead of stochiometric zirconium hydride, ZrH2, will be clarified in Section 1.3.1.)
In addition to Be and C, the chemically more stable BeO and SiC are analyzed.  The general neutronic
characteristics of these materials are reported in Table 1.  The most important parameter is the scattering 
density, which is proportional to the neutron slow-down energy deposited in the unit volume of the 
material.  It should be noted that ZrH1.6 actually has a somewhat better scattering density than water, and 
much better than all other moderators, while its absorption cross section is higher.
Table 1.  General characteristics of neutron moderators.
Moderating ElementMaterial / Density
(g/cm3) Element / Mass # Number Density 
(1022/cm3)
Scattering Density* 
(1/cm)
Thermal capture cx
(1/cm)
H2O / 0.78 H /1 5.22 0.205 0.015
ZrH1.6 / 5.64 H / 1 5.85 0.230 0.023
Be / 1.85 Be / 9 12.38 0.119 0.0008
BeO / 3.01 Be / 9 7.25 0.070 0.0005
C / 2.00 C / 12 10.04 0.067 0.0003
SiC / 3.16 C / 12 4.75 0.032 0.007
* The scattering density is defined as (1-α)Σs where Σs is the fast elastic scattering cross section and α=[(A-
1)/(A+1)]2 with A being the mass number.
The cell geometry for the neutronic calculations is illustrated in Figure 4.  It is demonstrated in 
Appendix A that this geometry enables achievement of a high power density while meeting the
temperature constraints on the cladding and fuel.  The active fuel length is 4.27 m (14 ft).  A fission gas 
plenum of about 40 cm is provided at the 
top of the fuel pins.  The fuel is UO2 with 
uniform 4 at% U-235 enrichment and
95% theoretical density (∼10.42 g/cm3).
The fuel cladding and moderator box
wall are made of Alloy 718 with 8.19 
g/cm3 density.  The nominal composition 
of Alloy 718 is (in wt%) Ni=52.90,
Cr=19.08, Fe=18.122, Nb=5.05,
Mo=3.01, Ti=0.91, Al=0.49, Mn=0.20,
Si=0.19, C=0.038, V=0.01.  The lower 
and upper reflectors of 3 cm thickness 
each are also made of Alloy 718.  The 
lower and upper coolant plena are
modeled as semi-infinite volumes filled 
with coolant of density corresponding to 
the core inlet and outlet temperature,
respectively.  Therefore, axial leakage is accounted for.  On the other hand, the cell vertical boundaries 
are modeled as perfectly reflective.  The calculations are performed with the Monte Carlo code MCNP4B.
The number of neutron histories followed for each case is 105 resulting in an uncertainty of about ±0.002
Moderator
Fuel
Coolant
Cladding
(Alloy 718)
Moderator Box 
(Alloy 718)
0.57mm
9.6mm
0.57mm
23.23mm
Figure 4.  Cross-sectional view of the core cell with 
moderator box.
6on the value of the multiplication factor.  In order to input the coolant density profile and calculate the 
axial power profile, the coolant and fuel pin regions are divided into 20 axial zones each.  The axial 
profile of the coolant density is that of Figure 2.
The reactivity results are
illustrated in Figure 5 in terms of 
the multiplication factor, keff.  The 
multiplication factor for a PWR fuel 
pin with Zircaloy-4 cladding and for 
a fictitious PWR pin with Alloy 718 
cladding are also reported for
reference1.  Figures 6 and 7 show 
the normalized neutron spectra in 
the upper core region (where
virtually no moderation is provided 
by the coolant) and the axial power 
profiles, respectively.  From Figure 
5 it is apparent that among the
SCWR moderators water performs 
best reactivity-wise, closely
followed by ZrH1.6.  The other solid 
moderators exhibit significantly
lower reactivity, with BeO and SiC 
performing worse than Be and C,
respectively.  Also, a comparison of 
the two PWR cases suggests that the 
reactivity penalty associated with
the use of Alloy 718 instead of the 
low-absorbing Zircaloy-4 is
significant2.  However, this penalty 
is an intrinsic characteristic of the 
SCWR (for which zirconium alloys 
cannot be used because of their low 
strength at high-temperature) and
thus is not instrumental in
discriminating between moderators.
Figure 6 confirms that ZrH1.6 is an 
excellent material to moderate neutrons, while the other solid moderators fail to generate a significant 
thermal component.  This was expected on the basis of the scattering density data.  This observation is 
corroborated by Figure 7 where it is shown that for Be and C the fission power is very low in the upper 
half where all moderation is due to the moderator.  Note that the axial power profiles in Figure 7 should 
be regarded only as qualitative for two reasons.  First, the reactivity feedback on the coolant density axial 
profile was not accounted for; second, the profiles are not optimized because uniform enrichment was 
assumed.  One might design the axial enrichment distribution to flatten the power peaking. 
1 The geometry and fuel composition for the PWR pin calculations are the same as for the SCWR cell, but with a 
typical PWR pitch-to-diameter ratio of 1.33, an average coolant density of 0.712 g/cm3 and without the moderating 
box.
2 It should be emphasized that the difference between the PWR case with Alloy 718 and the SCWR cases with Alloy 
718 and water or ZrH1.6 as the moderator is due to the parasitic captures in the moderator box wall.
1
1.05
1.1
1.15
1.2
1.25
1.3
1.35
1.4
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Figure 5.  Reactivity performance.
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Figure 6.  Neutron energy spectra for selected moderators.
7These results clearly indicate that the 
only neutronically acceptable moderators 
for the SCWR geometry of Figure 4 are 
water and ZrH1.6.  To make the other
solid moderators more effective, larger 
moderator boxes would have to be used 
(with three, four or even five fuel pins 
per side), but this would drastically
reduce the core power density, thus
negatively affecting costs.  Therefore, the 
only solid moderator that will be further 
explored is ZrH1.6.  The reactivity gap
between water rods and ZrH1.6 can be
closed with a modest enrichment increase 
of about 11%, i.e., the multiplication
factor for ZrH1.6 at 4.45 at% U-235
enrichment is equal to the multiplication 
factor for water rods at 4.0 at% U-235
enrichment.
We conclude the neutronic section of 
this study by noting that the SCWR core 
with ZrH1.6 moderator boxes maintains 
the important LWR safety characteristic 
of having a negative coolant void
reactivity coefficient.  To demonstrate
this, a series of calculations have been 
performed in which the core power-to-
flow ratio (Q/M) was varied (while
keeping the inlet temperature at 280°C
and the cosine axial power profile) to
simulate under- and over-cooling
transients.  The coolant axial density
profile was generated for each case
(Figure 8) and was fed to MCNP to
calculate the multiplication factor.  The 
results are illustrated in Figure 9.  It can 
be seen that the reactivity monotonically 
decreases with the power-to-flow ratio
(i.e., with decreasing average coolant
density).  Flooding the core (Q/M=0)
results in a reactivity insertion of 0.01 or 
about $1.4 (assuming a 0.007 delayed
neutron fraction) with respect to the
nominal conditions.  On the other hand, 
voiding the core (Q/M=∞) results in a
reactivity decrease of 0.01 or again about 
$1.4.
1 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0
Figure 7.  Axial power profiles for selected moderators.
Figure 8.  Coolant density distribution in the SCWR 
core at different power levels.
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Figure 9.  Reactivity of the SCWR core with ZrHx
moderator at different power levels.
81.3.  Zirconium Hydride
1.3.1.  General Characteristics
Zirconium hydride is not new to the nuclear industry.  Various nuclear applications were considered 
in the past including moderator for thermal reactors, control material for fast reactors, and shielding 
material [Van Houten 1974].  Hexagonal bars of zirconium hydride moderator were successfully utilized 
in the Heat Transfer Reactor Experiment-3 (HTRE-3) within the Aircraft Nuclear Propulsion Program in 
the late 50s and early 60s [Mueller 1968a].  Zirconium hydride was used as a moderator also in the 
Systems for Nuclear Auxiliary Power (SNAP) reactors for spacecraft and satellite applications [Huffine 
1968].  Furthermore, a thorough investigation of zirconium hydride was performed for application as a 
moderator in a maritime carbon-dioxide-cooled reactor using a closed-cycle gas turbine [Mueller 1968a].
However, perhaps most importantly, a dispersion of enriched uranium in a matrix of zirconium hydride 
has been developed and used as the fuel for the General Atomics TRIGA research reactor (a mature and 
popular product worldwide) for over 40 years [Simnad 1981].  Therefore, considerable information on the 
thermodynamic, transport, mechanical, and irradiation properties of zirconium hydride is available in the 
literature.
A phase diagram of the zirconium-hydrogen binary system (or ZrHx, with x being the hydrogen-to-
zirconium ratio) is illustrated in Figure 10.  There are four phases: the α phase has the hexagonal close-
packed (hcp) lattice typical of zirconium metal, the β phase has the body-centered cubic (bcc) lattice also 
typical of zirconium metal, while the δ phase and the ε  phase have a face-centered cubic (fcc) and a face-
centered tetragonal (fct) lattice, respectively.  At relatively low hydrogen contents (e.g., x<1.4) zirconium 
hydride is a solid solution of hydrogen in a zirconium metal lattice.  At higher hydrogen contents actual 
hydride phases are formed.
β
β+δ
α+δ
δ
α+β
α+δ+γ (metastable) δ+ε
ε
T
em
pe
ra
tu
re
 (
°F)
X
Figure 10.  Phase diagram for zirconium hydride.
9The phases of interest to our application are the ones rich in hydrogen, i.e., the δ and ε  phases.  We 
select δ-phase zirconium hydride (with x=1.6) as the moderator for the SCWR core for the following 
reasons:
1) The δ phase exhibits better irradiation stability than the ε  phase.  The experiments reported by 
Paetz and Lucke [1972], Shcherbak et al. [1991], and Primakov et al. [1999] show that the δ
phase does not swell under neutron irradiation while the ε  phase swells by 0.5 vol% at a fast 
fluence of 1.3×1021 n/cm2 and up to 5 vol% at 6×1022 n/cm2.
2) For x=1.6 the δ phase is stable up to a temperature of at least 1040°C, while for x=2 the ε phase is 
stable only up to 903°C where a ε→δ transition occurs.  Given the relatively high temperatures 
expected during transients/accidents in the SCWR, this phase transition could occur, resulting in a 
significant density change of the moderator with undesirable consequences on core reactivity and 
integrity of the moderator box.
3) Use of the hydrogen-richer δ phase would result in only a modest neutronic improvement.  The 
keff for the SCWR cell of Section 2 with ZrH2 moderator is 1.136±0.002 vs 1.132±0.002 with 
ZrH1.6.
The room temperature density of ZrHx, is [Simnad 1981]:
0.0145x0.1541
1
? ZrHx +=   for x<1.6 (1)
0.0042x0.1706
1
? ZrHx +=   for x≥1.6 (2)
where ρZrHx is in g/cm3.  The linear thermal expansion coefficient of δ-phase ZrHx in the 25-300°C
temperature range varies between 6.7×10-6 and 10.0×10-6 1/°C [Yamanaka et al. 1999].  The melting point 
of zirconium hydride was estimated by Pinchuck et al. [1976] at 1882±75°C, i.e., somewhat higher than 
that of pure zirconium.  Measurements of the specific heat for δ-phase ZrHx were correlated by the 
following expression [Yamanaka et al. 1999]:
25523
p x)/T106.35810(1.943x)T102.00810(3.1034.746x25.02c ×+×−×+×++= −− (3)
where cp is in J/mol⋅K and T is in K.  This expression can be used in the 25-730°C temperature range.
For x=1.5-1.7 and T=25-430°C the thermal conductivity of δ-phase ZrHx ranges from 15 to 20 W/m⋅K
with a weak dependence on composition and temperature [Yamanaka et al. 2001].  The lower bound (15 
W/m⋅K) will be assumed for design calculations.
1.3.2.  ZrHx/Water Interaction
Compatibility with the coolant is a key feasibility issue for a moderator material.  Under normal 
operating conditions any interaction between ZrHx and water is prevented because the two materials are 
physically segregated by the moderator box.  In case of failure of the moderator box, the reaction of 
interest is:
ZrH2+2H2O→ZrO2+3H2 (4)
which has the following calculated Gibbs free energy:
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∆G= -447.9-0.03T (5)
where ∆G is in kJ/molZrH2 and T is in K.  Therefore, the reaction is exothermic, thermodynamically 
favored at all temperatures and generates hydrogen.  However, numerous experiments have shown that 
zirconium hydride has excellent corrosion resistance in water and steam also at very high temperature 
because it rapidly forms a protective zirconium oxide film, which prevents further oxidation [Simnad 
1981].  Bare zirconium hydride specimens were exposed to water at 300°C and 8.5 MPa for 400 hrs in an 
autoclave during TRIGA fuel testing.  The maximum extent of corrosion penetration was less than 50 µm.
Further, water quench tests were performed from elevated temperatures.  ZrHx rods of 25 mm diameter 
were heated to 800°C and then quenched with water.  No corrosion was observed.  Later these tests were 
extended to 900°C and 1200°C.  The only effect observed at 900°C was a slight surface discoloration, 
while at 1200°C the rod cracked but no massive oxidation could be detected.  While not conclusive, these 
observations clearly indicate that the problem of ZrHx/water interaction is much less intractable than 
suggested by equations 4 and 5.
Experiments in air at 760°C did not result in massive oxidation of the zirconium hydride either.  The 
oxidation front penetrated into the specimens only 0.5 mm after 100 hrs, thus confirming the benign 
nature of the ZrHx/air interaction as well [Blackledge 1968].
1.3.3.  Hydrogen Transport and Release
A more challenging issue associated with the use of ZrHx is that of hydrogen release.  At all 
compositions and temperatures ZrHx dissociates until an equilibrium hydrogen pressure is established.  In 
the case of the SCWR core, the ZrHx-H2 equilibrium would exist within the moderator box.  Hydrogen is 
hard to contain and will diffuse through the moderator box thus progressively reducing moderation in the 
core.  At the relatively low temperatures of steady-state operation for the moderator (<500°C), this is a 
fairly slow phenomenon.  However, given the time scale of the moderator residence in the core (i.e., up to 
4 yrs), it is a phenomenon that needs to be considered.  At the higher temperatures typical of accident 
events (≥850°C) an additional concern is that hydrogen can excessively pressurize the moderator box.  If 
this causes extensive failure of the moderator boxes throughout the core, large amounts of hydrogen will 
be released into the RPV and containment.  In this section we will evaluate the importance of these 
phenomena.  To do so, two properties are needed: the equilibrium ZrHx-H2 pressure as a function of 
temperature and x, and the hydrogen permeability for the moderator box material.
Three correlations for the equilibrium hydrogen pressure are reported in the literature [Wang and 
Olander 1995, Namba et al. 1984, Simnad 1981].  Figure 11 shows the predictions of the three 
correlations over a wide range of temperatures and for three different values of the hydrogen content, x.
As expected, the equilibrium hydrogen pressure increases with x and temperature.  Incidentally we shall 
emphasize that δ-phase ZrH1.6 has a significantly lower equilibrium hydrogen pressure than ε-phase ZrH2
resulting, for given temperature, in lower pressurization of the moderator box and lower diffusion of 
hydrogen through the moderator box wall, which further strengthens the rationale for selecting the δ
phase over the ε phase.  The agreement among the three correlations is fairly good.  However, we 
recommend the use of the Wang and Olander’s correlation, which was derived from a theoretical model 
for the δ phase and shows remarkable agreement with the experimental data.  The Wang and Olander 
correlation is:
T
102.07
5.21x8.01
x2
x
2lnlnP
4
H2
×−++−= (6)
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where the units for PH2 and T are atm and K, respectively.
x =1.8
x =1.6
x =1.4
Wang and Olander
Namba
- - - Simnad
_ _
___
Figure 11.  Equilibrium hydrogen pressure for ZrHx.
Figures 12 and 13 (from EG&G [1989]) illustrate the hydrogen permeability as a function of 
temperature for several different materials.
Figure 12.  Hydrogen permeability (1). Figure 13.  Hydrogen permeability (2).
The hydrogen permeability for high nickel alloys (e.g., Alloy 718) was evaluated from Figure 12 as:
3193.28/T6.7549
H2 10?
−−= (7)
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where ΠH2 is in mol⋅m-1s-1Pa-1/2 and T is in K.
1.3.3.1.  Steady-State hydrogen release
To calculate the release of hydrogen from the moderator box, we assume that the ZrHx-H2 equilibrium 
exists within the moderator box at the operating temperature of the moderator box inner surface.  Then, 
by definition of permeability, the hydrogen flux through the moderator box wall can be calculated as:
w
H2
H2 t
T)(x,P
(T)?J = (8)
where , J is in mol/m2s and τw=0.57 mm is the wall thickness.  The hydrogen balance for the moderator 
box is:
4SJ
dt
dx
NS Zr
2 −= ⇒
ZrSN
4J
dt
dx −= (9)
where t is time, S=23.232 mm is the moderator box side length and NZr=0.061 mol/cm
3 is the number of 
moles of zirconium atoms per unit volume of zirconium hydride.  Because J is a function of x and T, 
equation 9 is an ordinary differential equation for the unknown function x(t) with T as a parameter.  This 
equation can be readily solved with standard techniques.  The decrease of hydrogen content in ZrHx is 
illustrated in Figure 14 for an expected moderator box lifetime of 4 yrs (i.e., two refueling cycles of 2 yrs 
each) and for several different operating 
temperatures of the moderator box inner 
surface.  The maximum temperature of 
490°C was estimated at the end of
Appendix A under very conservative
assumptions for the hottest fuel
assembly.  In reality most moderator
boxes will operate at temperatures close 
to the coolant temperature (i.e., 280-
450°C).  However, it can be seen that,
even at the high temperature, the
hydrogen content drops by only 2.5%
over 4 yrs of operation (i.e., x=1.56 at 
end-of-life).  Conservatively assuming
that the 2.5% hydrogen drop is uniform 
throughout the core, the loss of neutron 
reactivity associated with the decrease of 
moderation was calculated by MCNP to 
be only 0.002 or less than 30 ¢.  Such a 
minute decrease of reactivity over a
period of 4 yrs is negligible if compared 
with the reactivity drop associated with fuel burnup, and thus can be readily handled by the control 
system.  Also, note that the drop in hydrogen content is not sufficient to cause a phase transition in the 
ZrHx (see Figure 10), so dimensional stability of the moderator is ensured.
The average rate of hydrogen release from a single moderator box corresponding to a 2.5% hydrogen 
content drop over 4 yrs lifetime would be about 1.6×10-4 mol/hr or 4 orders of magnitude lower than the
Figure 14.  Long-term hydrogen depletion in the ZrHx
moderator.
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estimated hydrogen generation by radiolysis of the coolant surrounding the moderator box (i.e., roughly 
1.4 mol/hr).  Therefore, steady-state hydrogen release from the moderator boxes represents no additional 
burden on the reactor off-gas system.
It is reported by Huang et al. [2000] that redistribution of hydrogen within ZrHx occurs in presence of 
a temperature gradient.  Diffusion of a gas within a solid is described by the following equation [Olander 
1976]:



 ∇+∇−= T
RT
Q
xxDJ 2 (10)
where J is the hydrogen flux, D is the diffusion coefficient, ∇ is the gradient operator, R is the gas 
constant and Q is the heat of transportation.  Equation 10 indicates that a temperature gradient can induce 
hydrogen diffusion, even if a concentration gradient is not initially present.  Diffusion continues until the 
following equilibrium condition is achieved:
T
RT
Q
-
x
x
2 ∇=∇ (11)
Equation 11 indicates that hydrogen tends to diffuse down the temperature gradient.  It also suggests that 
at equilibrium the deviation from the initial hydrogen concentration (∆x/x0) is proportional to the
temperature gradient and inversely proportional to the square of the mean temperature (∆T/T2):
2
0 T
? T
C
x
? x = (12)
where C is a proportionality constant.  This trend is confirmed by Huang et al.’s calculations for δ-phase
ZrHx, from which the value of C is estimated to be around 642 K.
In the SCWR case a temperature gradient is generated within the ZrHx moderator because of neutron 
and gamma heating.  In Appendix A the maximum operating temperatures of the moderator in the hottest 
fuel assembly are estimated to be 490°C (moderator surface) and 620°C (moderator centerline).  Thus, 
∆T=130 K, T=828 K, x0=1.6 and, from equation 12, ∆x∼0.2.  This means that the local value of x in the 
moderator box can be as high as x0+∆x/2=1.7 (at the moderator box inner surface) and as low as x0-
∆x/2=1.5 (at the moderator centerline).  This introduces some uncertainty on the value of x to be used in 
the hydrogen release calculations.  To bound the SCWR behavior, the hydrogen release was recalculated 
assuming x=1.7.  In this case the hydrogen content over 4 yrs of operation drops by about 3.5%, larger 
than for x=1.6, but again with negligible consequences on the core reactivity.
Finally it should be emphasized that redistribution of hydrogen within the moderator does not cause a 
phase transition, i.e., the x=1.5-1.7 range estimated for the SCWR is well within the field of stability of δ-
phase ZrHx at the temperatures of interest.
1.3.3.2.  Hydrogen Release During Accident Conditions
We shall now analyze the issue of moderator box pressurization by hydrogen at the high temperatures 
typical of accident conditions.  Note that, if the reactor has not depressurized, compressive stresses will 
exist in the moderator box wall due to the high external pressure of the coolant.  However, the most 
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severe conditions for failure of the moderator box are ones in which the reactor has depressurized, e.g., 
during a LOCA.  Under such conditions (i.e., low external pressure and high temperature) tensile stresses 
are generated in the moderator box wall due to the internal surge of hydrogen pressure.  A simple static 
equilibrium analysis provides an expression for the tangential membrane stress in the moderator box wall:
w
H2t
2t
S
Ps = (13)
where PH2 depends on x and T as per equation 6. σt is plotted in Figure 15 as a function of temperature 
for two values of the hydrogen content, and is 
compared with the yield stress of Alloy 718.
Unfortunately the mechanical properties of 
Alloy 718 could only be found for
temperatures up to 870°C [ASM 1990].
Therefore, for the purpose of this calculation 
the yield stress had to be linearly extrapolated 
resulting in a zero value at 930°C.  Figure 15 
shows that the maximum allowable
temperature for the moderator box is about 
925°C.  However, we recommend a value of 
900°C for which a very large safety margin 
to failure (>5) is provided even for the case 
with hydrogen redistribution (x=1.7).  Note 
that the use of the yield stress as the failure 
criterion is justified by the expected low
frequency of LOCA events.
We shall now assess the hydrogen release 
through the moderator box wall at the
established limit of 900°C.  Equations 8 and 
9 still hold for this calculation.  The decrease 
in hydrogen content during a transient for
which the moderator box is held at 900°C for 
24 hrs is shown in Figure 16.  The hydrogen 
content drop over this period of time is
significant.  Assuming a core of 1,000 MWth 
with 104 fuel pins and 2,000 moderator
boxes, the total release of hydrogen during 
such accident would be about 22,000 mol or 
45 kg.  If this amount of hydrogen cannot be 
handled by the recombiners in the
containment, two possible solutions are
envisioned: i) an inert containment could be 
adopted to eliminate the risk of hydrogen-
oxygen explosion, or ii) a coating of
hydrogen-impermeable material could be deposited on the inner surface of the moderator box to reduce 
hydrogen release in the first place.  Figures 12 and 13 show that aluminum, SiC, and pyrolytic carbon 
have a much lower permeability to hydrogen than nickel alloys.  For example, it is estimated by means of 
equations 8 and 9 that a 10 µm SiC coating layer on the inner surface of the moderator box would 
Figure 15.  High-temperature stresses in the 
moderator box wall.
Figure 16.  High-temperature hydrogen depletion in 
the ZrHx moderator.
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practically eliminate hydrogen release at 900°C (Figure 16).  Aluminide coatings on stainless steel have 
been shown to significantly reduce tritium permeability (Apley 1992, Marschman et al. 1991, Lanning et 
al. 1992).
1.3.4.  Thermal Capacity of ZrHx
The use of a solid moderator affords some benefits in terms of thermal performance of the core during 
an event in which the coolant is rapidly lost (e.g., a large-break LOCA).  The amount of ZrH1.6 in a single 
moderator box is about 13 kg or 140 mol.  Assuming an average value of 50 J/mol·K for the specific heat 
(as per equation 3 for T=600ºC and x=1.6) the thermal capacity of the moderator box is 7000 J/K.
Because there are 5 fuel pins for each moderator box, the moderator adds 7000/5=1400 J/K of extra 
thermal capacity per fuel pin.  Considering that for a UO2 specific heat of 450 J/kg·K the estimated 
thermal capacity of a fuel pin is about 1140 J/K, it can be concluded that the ZrHx moderator effectively 
more than doubles the thermal capacity of the core.
1.3.5.  ZrHx/Alloy 718 Compatibility
The three main constituents of Alloy 718 (i.e., nickel, chromium, and iron) do not form stable hydrides 
at the hydrogen pressures and temperatures of interest to our application [Siegel and Libowitz 1968].
Therefore, massive hydriding of the moderator box is not a concern.  Among the other constituents of 
Alloy 718, only titanium (nominally present at 0.9 wt%) forms stable hydrides (i.e., TiHx).  However, 
note that, for any given temperature and composition, the dissociation pressure of TiHx is higher than that 
of ZrHx.  Therefore, in our system (where the hydrogen pressure is set by the ZrHx-H2 equilibrium) the 
value of x for TiH x at any given temperature will always be lower than 1.6, i.e., the value of x for ZrHx.
On the basis of the temperature-pressure-composition (PH2-T-x) diagrams for TiH x reported by Mueller 
[1968b], we estimate that less than 5% of the titanium in the Alloy 718 (or about 450 wt ppm of the 
whole alloy) will react to form hydrides over the 280-470°C temperature range of normal operation for 
the moderator box.  At this point it is hard to tell if such a minute amount of titanium hydride will have 
some effect on the strength or corrosion performance of the Alloy 718.  This can be further reduced by the 
use of an aluminide coating on the inside surface as discussed above.
Like most high-strength alloys, Alloy 718 is susceptible to hydrogen embrittlement.  Nevertheless, it 
has been extensively and successfully used as a structural material in hydrogen environments from 
cryogenic to elevated temperatures [He et al. 1994, Lenhart et al. 1992, Gross 1990].  Furthemore, there 
are two mitigating factors suggesting that hydrogen embrittlement should not be a serious problem in our 
case: i) embrittlement becomes important when plastic stresses are present, but the moderator box 
operates well below the yield point even at high temperature, and ii) embrittlement is mostly a concern at 
low temperatures (i.e., room temperature and below), while the moderator box operates at relatively-high
temperatures (>280°C).
A third issue to consider is that of diffusion of zirconium into the moderator box at high temperature.
If intermetallic compounds are possible (as is the case for the Zr-Ni couple [Elliott 1965]), zirconium 
diffusion can result in the formation of a weak and brittle interaction layer, which can lead to failure of 
the moderator box.  For this reason Huffine [1968] states that nickel alloys are not suitable for cladding of 
zirconium hydrides without a protective coating acting as a barrier to zirconium diffusion.  However, 
contrary to Huffine, Van Houten [1974] reports that nickel alloys are routinely used for cladding of 
zirconium hydrides.  If in fact a protective coating is needed, Huffine [1968] recommends molybdenum, 
which has been used successfully, either plasma sprayed or in thin foils.  Only few microns of material 
are needed to arrest zirconium diffusion.  Incidentally, we shall note that a thin molybdenum layer, 
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although helpful, would not solve the problem of hydrogen release at high temperature discussed at the 
end of Section 1.3.3.2, so that a coating of hydrogen-impermeable material would still be needed.
1.3.6.  Fabrication of ZrHx
Huffine [1968] and Van Houten [1974] provide good reviews (albeit relatively old) of the fabrication 
technology for metal hydride components.  Zirconium hydride is best produced by direct exposure of 
zirconium metal to hydrogen gas in a furnace of controlled temperature and hydrogen pressure.
Hydrogen diffuses within the metal matrix until equilibrium is achieved.  This process is called metal 
hydriding.  The desired phase (or value of x) can be produced by selecting the process temperature and 
the hydrogen pressure as per the PH2-T-x relation of Equation 6.  For example, hydriding with a hydrogen 
pressure of 0.01 atm at a temperature of 600°C would produce δ-phase zirconium hydride with x=1.6.
Obviously, if the δ phase is to be preserved during cooldown to room temperature, the pressure of 
hydrogen must be continuously adjusted to follow an isocore (i.e., a curve of given x value).  Oxygen and 
nitrogen impurities in the hydrogen gas must be minimized, as they would cause formation of oxide 
and/or nitride films on the metal surface, thus impairing hydrogen diffusion during the hydriding process.
Also, oxygen affects the phase stability of the zirconium hydride, i.e., it shifts the δ→ε transition to lower 
hydrogen contents.  However, at the specified low levels of oxygen impurities in reactor-grade zirconium 
(<1000 wt ppm or <1 at. %) this effect is expected to be negligible [Beck and Mueller 1968].  Finally, it 
should be emphasized that uniform and cost effective hydriding of zirconium parts with cross sections as 
wide as 7 cm has been successfully performed in the past; the proposed moderator rods for the SCWR fall 
well within this established range.
In principle, once the hydriding process is complete, there are two approaches to proceed on to the 
final product:
1) Grinding of the hydride and then powder compaction and sintering to the desired geometry,
2) Direct machining of the hydride.
The first approach presents several disadvantages.  When the ZrHx powder is handled in air, the 
importance of oxidation and the effect of oxygen contamination on phase stability are higher because of 
the large surface-to-volume ratio.  This might require performing fabrication in boxes with an inert 
atmosphere, which negatively affects costs.  Also, the sintering step would be considerably complicated 
because of the need to maintain extremely high hydrogen equilibrium pressures (>300 MPa for x=1.6 and 
T=1600°C) in order to prevent massive de-hydriding.  Finally, the sintered material would have worse 
thermo-mechanical properties (e.g., thermal conductivity and strength) than the original as-hydrided
material because of the lower-than-theoretical density.
With the second approach the initial zirconium metal part must possess roughly the final geometry of 
the ZrHx part so that machining of the hydride can be minimized.  Informal talks with zirconium 
specialists at Allegheny Technologies [2002] indicated that fabrication of solid square rods of nuclear-
grade zirconium metal with the dimensions of interest to our application (i.e., ∼2×2 cm cross section, 
∼430 cm length) is a straightforward process comprising the following steps: a large forged zirconium 
slab (10 cm thick, 60 cm wide, 500 cm long) is hot rolled to produce a plate of 2 cm thickness.  The plate 
is then quenched at 870°C to stabilize the α phase and eliminate any grain orientation resulting from hot 
rolling.  Finally, the plate is cut in 2-cm wide strips to realize the ∼2×2 cm square cross section rods that 
will be hydrided.
The integrity of the as-hydrided metal with the first approach (i.e., grinding and sintering) is not 
important because the material is to be ground anyway.  However, the main issue with the second
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approach is that of producing a crack-free hydride.  This requires accurate control of the heating and 
cooling rates during hydriding, i.e., too quick a hydrogen pick-up or depletion can cause cracking of the 
material.  Another issue is that of expansion during hydriding, which usually occurs anisotropically along 
the three directions of the metal grains, hence in general requiring that the part be machined to its final 
geometry.  Huffine [1968] reports that zirconium hydride is a brittle material with machining properties 
between those of graphite and gray cast iron, and thus all machining operations are possible and relatively 
easy, including internal and external threading.  In fact, zirconium hydride rods of much greater geometric 
complexity than the ones analyzed in this report were successfully machined for the HTRE-3 project 
[Huffine 1968].  However, Van Houten later reported that, if the anisotropy of the initial zirconium metal 
is well characterized and the hydriding cycle is carefully controlled, the geometry of the as-hydrided
expanded part can be predicted within 0.1% of the desired dimension, which may eliminate the need for 
machining [Van Houten 1974].  Because of the very simple geometry of the SCWR moderator rods and 
because accurate characterization of zirconium anisotropy is common practice in the nuclear industry, it is 
likely that the machining step could be avoided in our case.
Once the zirconium hydride rod is fabricated, it needs to be inserted in the moderator box, or 
cladding.  One end of the moderator box is welded shut leaving the other open for insertion of the 
moderator rod.  Once the hydride is in, inert-gas-shielded arc welding is used, which is a rapid welding 
technique giving minimal heating of the area adjacent to the weld.  This is important to prevent localized 
de-hydriding of the hydride rod.  The residual gases in the box are removed through an evacuation tube 
connected to a vacuum pump.  Then the box can be re-pressurized with a proper cover gas (e.g., helium) 
and checked for leaks [Huffine 1968].
1.3.7.  Cost of the ZrHx Moderator Rods
In this section we estimate the cost of the ZrHx moderator rods and its impact on the cost of electricity 
generated by the SCWR.  The cost of nuclear-quality zirconium square rods (i.e., the starting point for the 
hydriding process) was estimated by Allegheny Technologies [2002] to be in the $90-110/kg range.  In 
our calculations we will assume the upper limit.  Also, Allegheny Technologies routinely conducts 
hydriding of zirconium for powder metallurgy purposes.  On the basis of their experience they estimate 
the hydriding process will increase the cost of the final product by 20-30%.  However, here we will 
assume that hydriding will double the cost of the product.  This is because, while in powder metallurgy 
the hydriding process does not have to be carefully controlled to avoid cracking of the initial zirconium, 
in our case it would.  Thus, considering that there is a mass of 13 kg of ZrH1.6 in each moderator rod, the 
cost of an unclad rod is $110/kg×13kg×2=$2860.  As for the moderator box, the cost of Alloy 718 was 
obtained from Dynamic Metal Forming [2002] at about $62 per kg of Alloy 718 ingot.  We shall assume 
that the cost of the end product (i.e., the actual box) is 10 times higher than that of the raw material.
Therefore, considering that the mass of Alloy 718 in one moderator box is about 1.9 kg, the cost of the 
moderator box is estimated as $62/kg×1.9kg×10=$1178.  Finally, we assume that inserting the zirconium-
hydride in the moderator box, plus sealing and testing will double the cost of the final product.  Then the 
cost of a clad zirconium-hydride rod ready to go into a fuel assembly is ($2860+$1178)×2=$8076.  We 
shall indicate this cost as CM.
To calculate the impact on the cost of electricity, we have to account for several factors including the 
amount of electricity generated per rod of  solid moderator, the payment of interest during in-reactor
residence, and the depreciation of the asset.  We will make use of the following assumptions:
- MUO2 is the mass of UO2 fuel associated with a single moderator rod.  Because there are 5 fuel 
rods for each moderator rod, and each fuel rod contains about 2.5 kg of UO2, the total mass of 
fuel is MUO2=12.5 kg 
- The discharge burnup for the SCWR is assumed to be B=45,000 kWD/kg
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- The reactor thermal efficiency is η=0.42
- The in-reactor residence time is N=4 yrs
- The marginal tax rate is τ=30%
- The after-tax averaged cost of capital is i=10%
- The salvage value of the moderator is $ 0
- A linear depreciation schedule is assumed.
Then the cost of the solid moderator, c ($/kWh), levelized over the in-reactor residence time is:
Φ⋅⋅⋅= ?BM24
C
c
UO2
M (14)
where the factor 24 accounts for the conversion of days to hours, and Φ  is the levelized annual capital 
carrying charge factor, calculated as follows:
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where (A/P,i,N) is the capital recovery factor [Park 1990]:
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Equation 14 yields a value of $0.005/kWh or 0.5 mills/kWh.  Therefore, assuming a target total cost 
of electricity of 30 mills/kWh, the use of zirconium hydride moderator rods in the core would represent an 
estimated increase of less than 2%.  This increase is negligible if compared with more important factors in 
determining the total cost of electricity like plant capital cost, effective maintenance, and outage duration,
which, incidentally, would be made relatively easier with a solid moderator than with water rods.
1.4.  Conclusions
The neutronic performance of several solid moderators for the SCWR core was evaluated and
compared to that of water rods.  It was found that the only acceptable solid moderator is δ-phase
zirconium hydride (ZrH1.6), which generates a relatively high multiplication factor and a negative coolant 
void reactivity coefficient.  Several issues key to the chemical and thermo-mechanical feasibility of ZrH1.6
were assessed including zirconium-hydride/water interaction, hydrogen release, hydrogen redistribution, 
pressurization of the moderator box at high temperature, phase stability, and compatibility of zirconium 
hydride with the moderator box material.  It was found that:
1) The chemical reaction of zirconium hydride with water is thermodynamically favored but 
kinetically impaired even at high temperatures.
2) Hydrogen release is low at steady-state, while the use of a hydrogen-impermeable coating on
the inner surface of the moderator box might be required at higher temperatures.
3) The moderator-box wall temperature during a LOCA should be limited to 900°C to prevent 
failure from internal hydrogen pressure.
4) Hydrogen redistribution and release do not threaten the stability of δ-phase zirconium 
hydride.
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5) The use of a solid moderator greatly enhances the thermal capacity of the SCWR core.
6) The issues of hydriding and hydrogen embrittlement of the moderator box material, Alloy 
718, appear of little concern, while high-temperature diffusion of zirconium into Alloy 718 
might have to be prevented by means of a thin molybdenum protective coating.
7) Finally, fabrication of the SCWR moderator rods appears feasible within the envelope of 
existing technology.
In the cost area a simple analysis indicated that the use of zirconium-hydride moderator will not result 
in significant economic penalization of the SCWR.
At this point no insurmountable difficulties have been identified in the development of zirconium 
hydride moderator rods for SCWR thermal-spectrum cores, and thus this approach will be further pursued 
in the project.
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Task 2 Results: Fuel Cladding and Structural Material 
Corrosion and Stress Corrosion Cracking Studies
2.1.  Progress of Work at MIT
2.1.1.  Identification of Most Promising Materials
A formal literature survey has been initiated and preliminary results follow.  Hattori et. al. [2000] 
investigated the oxidation resistance in high pressure superheated steam of several candidate materials: 
austenitic steels, nickel base alloys, Ti alloys, and high Cr ferritic steels.
The high Cr ferritic steels, Mod 9Cr-Mo steel, and 12Cr-1Mo steel are commonly used as heat 
resistant tubes in fossil power plants.  Austenitic type SUS316 stainless steels is generally used in many 
industries in addition to nuclear power plants.  Type SUS310 is also corrosion resistant because of the 
high Cr content.  The high Ni alloys, Alloy 690 and Alloy 718, have been used in light water reactors as 
steam generator tube and leaf spring materials, respectively.  Ti-3Al-2.5V alloy is a representative α-Ti
alloy mainly used for tube material in airplanes.  Ti-15V-3Al-3Sn-3Cr alloy was selected as a β-Ti alloy 
because of corrosion resistance and formability at room temperature.
Autoclave tests were carried out in SCW at 566°C, 25MPa, and superheated steam at 566°C, 12MPa.
The test duration was 2000 hours (deaerated) and 750 hours (aerated).  The relative corrosion rates of the 
test specimens (normalized by the corrosion rate of SUS310 in the deaerated superheated steam) were 
compared.  The corrosion rates were calculated based on the reduction of the thickness of the specimens 
after descaling, except for the Ti alloys.  In the latter case, the corrosion rate was calculated from the 
weight gains.
For the deaerated condition, the corrosion rate of the high Cr ferritic steels was about 10 - 20 times 
higher than that of SUS310.  The high Ni alloys and SUS310 showed the highest corrosion resistance for 
this condition.  In deaerated superheated steam, the oxide thickness of SUS316 was a few microns after 
2000 hours.  The experimental results suggest that, for the materials tested, austenitic stainless steels, and 
the high nickel alloys were likely to be more promising for SCR cladding material.
Kondo et al. [1998] report the results of corrosion tests for low activation ferritic/martensitic steel 
(F82H) and several boiler steels (HCM12A, NF616, HCM2S, STBA24).  Of these materials, STBA24 has 
been widely used for heat exchanger tubes in conventional boilers, and has a service temperature around 
560oC.  HCM12A, NF616, and HCM2S are the current candidate materials for advanced boilers.  The 
expected service temperature for HCM12A and NF616 is 600oC to 610oC.  Both HCM12A and NF616
have a ferritic/martensitic microstructure.  The tests were carried out for up to 300 hours at 650°C and 
8.6MPa.
The corrosion behavior of conventional steels are known to depend mainly on Cr content.  The low 
activation ferritic/martensitic steel, F82H, which contains 7.6%Cr showed corrosion resistance similar to 
the series of boiler tubing materials consistent with Cr content.  From their results, a double -layered oxide 
film with an iron-rich outer layer and Cr enrichment in the inner layer were formed on F82H.  It is known 
that the separation of the Fe-rich outer layer and Cr-rich inner layer is due to higher diffusion rate of the 
Fe ions with respect to Cr ions and that the inner layer is a better diffusion barrier, and it mainly 
contributes to the oxidation resistance of the steels.  Consequently, the anodic dissolutions of F82H and 
several boiler-tubing materials is controlled by the Cr-rich inner layer.
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2.1.2.  Corrosion and Stress Corrosion Cracking of Candidate Materials
Figure 17 presents a schematic representation of the current SCW facilities at MIT.  (This facility was 
described in more detail in the first two quarterlies of this project.)  The exposure facility incorporates a 
relatively large
autoclave with an
internal volume of
approximately 860 mls.
It is large enough to
expose a rack of weight 
loss, welded, and u-
bend samples for
extended times.
At the culmination 
of the meeting in Ann 
Arbor, it was decided
that initial experiments 
should be carried out
using 316L, and
Inconel-625 as baseline 
materials.  Preparations 
are currently underway 
to conduct
instrumented-tube
experiments with these 
materials.  The samples 
will be exposed to 15
mega ohm water over a
temperature range encompassing
both sub- and supercritical
conditions.
Preliminary data from
Inconel-625 suggest the potential 
for localized breakdown both for 
exposed and occluded regions.
Figure 18 presents a scanning
confocal laser micrograph of the 
surface of an Inconel-625 sample 
exposed at MIT to 15-mega ohm 
water at a temperature of 300°C 
for 240 hours.  The surface profile 
(uneven white line) represents the 
situation along the length of the 
solid white line positioned over
the pit.  This indicates that the pit 
has a depth of 4.46 µm and a
diameter of 19.3 µm.
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Figure 17.  Schematic of the MIT SCW loop.
Figure 18.  The exposed surface of an alloy 625 sample after 
240 hours at 300°C in 15 mega ohm water.
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Figure 19 reveals pitting within the occluded region formed by an alumina spacer for the same 
Inconel-625 sample presented in Figure 18.  In this case, however, a corrosion product cap has formed 
over a portion of the pit, likely suggesting a different microenvironment within the occluded region.  The 
pit diameter is approximately 12 µm and the depth of the open portion of the pit is about 2 µm.
Figure 19.  The shielded surface of an Alloy-625 sample exposed to 15 mega ohm water at 300°C for 
240 hours.
2.2.  Progress of Work at the University of Michigan
The design and fabrication of the University of Michigan supercritical water loop system for stress 
corrosion cracking tests was completed during the first two quarters of this NERI project.  In this loop 
system, one tensile sample can be tested in various loading modes such as constant extension rate tension 
(CERT), constant load, ramp and hold, low cycle fatigue, etc.  Additionally, 6 U-bend samples can be 
loaded into the test vessel, using sample holders secured to the vessel internal support plate.  The system 
provides proper test conditions for stress-corrosion-cracking tests such as environmental and loading 
conditions.  The main loop components are the test vessel, loading frame, main pump, heating elements, 
back pressure regulator, and water columns.  Figure 20 shows a schematic of the water loop.  Figures 21 
and 22 show the overall view of the loop system and the load frame and loading elements.
During this quarter, the Supercritical Water Test Facility was evaluated.  The test conditions have 
been reached and a dummy sample has been strained in these conditions.  Several tests have been
performed with the goal of determining the influence of pressure variation on load and LVDT
displacement and the relationship between the load detected by the load cell and the load actually 
experienced by the sample.  Also, the chemical environment has been surveyed and new steps have been 
taken for safety purposes.
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Figure 20.  Schematic of the Supercritical water loop for stress corrosion cracking tests at the 
University of Michigan.
Figure 21.  Overall view of the University of Michigan supercritical water loop system.
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Figure 22.  Supercritical water system: load frame and loading elements
2.2.1.  Performance Test
Test conditions (25.5 MPa (3700 psig), 550 ºC) were reached and maintain for a period of 20 hours 
for the first time on June 14, 2002.  Figure 23 shows the temperature and pressure history for the 
performance test.  The first graph shows that the temperature was quite stable with a variation of around 
+2 ºC.  The second graph shows the pressure variation during the increase in temperature to the set-point
of 550°C.  The pressure varied by around 0.7 MPa (100 psig) during the temperature rise.  Once the 
temperature had stabilized, the variation of pressure was reduced to only about + 0.14 MPa (20 psig).
Temperature (ºC) Pressure (psig) Pressure (psig)
Variation range of the 
temperature at the test 
condition.
Evolution of the pressure during the 
temperature increase (before test 
conditions were achieved).
Evolution of the pressure when 
the temperature is stable.
Figure 23.  Performance test at 550°C and 25.5 MPa (3700 psi).
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2.2.2.  Sample Loading At Test Conditions
A dummy sample was strained in supercritical water (25.5 MPa, 550 ºC) to about 6% strain.  On the 
load versus time curve shown in Figure 24, the load cell records an increase of load, whereas the pull rod 
doesn’t move until a load of 80 lbs is reached.  Then the load drops before increasing again.  This 
behavior during the period of elastic deformation is probably due to friction between the bal seals and the 
pull rod.  When the sample is strained, the load recorded by the load cell is less stable (±15 lbs of 
variation) than it was during the test performed at 20 ºC and 0 MPa (0 psig).  In order to capture the actual 
stress-strain behavior, a series of tests were performed to determine the relationship between the pressure 
and recorded load.
Figure 24.  Load and displacement versus time obtained with a dummy sample in test conditions 
(25.5 MPa, 550 ºC).  The inset to the right shows the load versus time taken from a sample strained 
in air.  The drop in load during the period of elastic deformation is due to friction between the bal 
seals and the pull rod.
2.2.3.  Influence Of A 
Pressure Change On 
Displacement And Load
To determine if either the variation 
of pressure during a test (in supercritical 
water) or the increase of pressure at the 
beginning of the test can have any effect 
on the load and extension of the sample, 
several tests were performed.  As shown 
in Figure 25, at the supercritical
condition, there is no correlation
between a pressure change of around 1.4 
MPa (200 psig) and the variation range 
of the load (15 lb). 
At room temperature, pressure
changes were observed to affect load
15 lbs
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Figure 25.  Response of load to a change in pressure at 
supercritical water condition (25.5 MPa, 550ºC).
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and displacement.  Figure 26 plots the response of load and displacement to a pressure change at room 
temperature.  To be able to read the response of load during the test, the initial load was set as 240 lb.
First the pressure was increased from 0 to 2000 psig in 2 steps of 1000 psig each.  Then the pressure was 
dropped to zero in the same step-wise manner.  Each pressure change implies a response of load and 
displacement.  An increase of pressure causes a decrease in load, and vice-versa.  This behavior is 
somewhat puzzling since with a pressure balance system, the load should be insensitive to changes in 
pressure as in the supercritical condition shown in Figure 25.
Figure 26.  Response of load and displacement to a change in pressure at room temperature.  Each 
change of pressure causes an opposite reaction to the load.
The response of displacement is also 
not well understood. Some unanticipated 
behavior, such as a drop in displacement 
related to a drop of load (A), or an
increase in displacement related to an
increase of load (B) was recorded.  The 
effects of these results on the actual
behavior on the sample is still not clear,
but as the peculiar behavior takes place 
while the sample was being strained
elastically, they are not expected to
adversely affect a constant extension rate 
experiment that is typically taken to
several tens of percent plastic strain.
Figure 27 shows the effect of
pressure changes on the measured load at 
room temperature, when pressure is
increased from 0 MPa to 25.5 MPa (3700 
psig).  The graph shows that the
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Figure 27.  Change in displacement during an increase in 
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displacement changes by about 30 µm. (The pull rod contracts around 30 µm when the pressure is 
increased from 0 to 25.5 MPa).  Such a small displacement should not impact the sample strain, 
particularly if there is play in the load-train.
2.2.4.  Estimation Of The Load And Lengthening Of The Sample
The general shape of the load
versus time plot recorded during a
straining test performed in our facility 
is plotted in Figure 28.  This shape 
can be divided in 3 regimes.  In the 
first, the load reaches the maximum 
static friction due to the bal seals on 
the pull rod.  When the load exceeds 
the static friction force, the rod starts 
to move (Regime 2).  As there is some 
play in the load-train, the load doesn’t 
increase immediately because the only 
force on the load cell is due to the 
dynamic friction of the bal seals on 
the rod.  In the 3rd regime, the entire 
pull rod line is tight and the sample is 
strained.  So, when a sample is
strained, the recorded load includes
the contribution of dynamic friction.
To determine the friction force, a 
sample of 316 steel was strained to 
just above the yield stress at room 
temperature in air and in high-
pressure (25.5 MPa) water, Figure 29.
Curve A, taken from the test
performed in air, shows that the load 
reaches 12 lbs before it decreases
somewhat and then maintains a steady 
value for 2000 seconds until the
sample begins to strain.  This test
allowed us to determine that the
friction on the pull rod is around 12 
lbs at 0 MPa.  If this factor is taken 
into account, the yield stress of the 
sample becomes 225 MPa, which is in 
agreement with the value given by the 
supplier (220 MPa).
Curve B, taken from the test
performed at 25.5 MPa, shows that
the static friction in the system is 77 
lbs and the dynamic friction is 33 lbs. 
This data allows us to determine the 
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Figure 28.  General shape of load versus time and
displacement versus time curves.  The static stress and the
dynamic friction of the bal seals on the pull rod affect the 
load recorded by the load cell.
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Figure 29.  Load versus time curves of a sample strained in 
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true load and lengthening of the sample from the recorded data.
After the test, the sample was removed and the plastic deformation was determined by measuring the 
length change of the sample.  The measured elongation was 90±25 µm.  The displacement recorded by 
the LVDT during the test was 110 µm.  This value is within the error range of the sample elongation 
measured directly on the sample after the test and as such, the two readings are reasonably consistent.
2.2.5. Future Work
The objective for this task over the next quarter is threefold: completion of the load-displacement
performance characterization of the system, control of the water chemistry for the system, and the 
development of a safety system that permits the operation of the system overnight.
The remaining work to be done on the mechanical behavior of the system includes the determination 
of the static and dynamic friction of the bal seals on the pull rod pressure at supercritical water condition 
(25.5 MPa, 550 ºC).  It then will be possible to relate the load recorded by the load cell to the load 
experienced by the sample.
Regarding the water chemistry control, the main column is currently contaminated and needs to be 
cleaned.  In the outlet line, the minimum conductivity recorded at room temperature is higher than the 
desired conditions so the loop needs to be cleaned and tests need to be performed that ensure that the 
outlet conductivity remains low during an experiment.
A safety program is being developed to allow the operation of the system 24 hours per day.  This 
system is located in a laboratory with four other autoclaves and multiple users.  Due to the temperatures 
and pressures used in this loop, a monitoring system needs to be developed that watches the temperature 
and pressure and alerts the operator when either exceed preset limits.  We will accomplish this with a 
pager system that is linked to the Labview software to maintain contact between the person in charge and 
the system 24 hours a day.  A temperature control system using the computer recording data is also being 
developed to replace the temperature controllers that are currently being used.
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Task 3 Results:  Preliminary Thermal Hydraulic 
Considerations and Core Design Criteria 
(Westinghouse Electric Company)
This section of the quarterly report contains our preliminary design criteria and thermal-hydraulic
analyses for the SCWR.  Some preliminary considerations on the system that help define the space of the 
analysis, and provide some preliminary dimensions for the fuel lattice, are discussed in Section 3.1.  Then 
the design criteria for the system will be defined and the correlations (for heat transfer in supercritical 
water), and the methods (for hot channel factors) that will be used to verify the proposed design criteria 
for the fuel system, will be discussed (Section 3.2).  Once the criteria, tools, and methods for the thermal-
hydraulic analysis of the core have been introduced, a preliminary investigation will discuss the different 
options available and study the temperature and density profiles in the hot and average channels of the 
system.  The nomenclature, subscripts, and acronyms used in this section are defined in Appendix B.
3.1.  Core Thermal Hydraulics: Scope of the Investigation
The definition of a preliminary core layout (geometric dimensions, core configuration) and thermal-
hydraulic design (temperature, pressure, flow rates) is required to start the detailed neutronic design of the 
core for the supercritical reactor.  Following the neutronic analyses, the core thermal-hydraulic design 
will be reviewed to take into consideration neutronic issues and optimization.  The core outlet conditions 
have been preliminarily selected (MacDonald 2002) based on overall design and performance goals as:
Core Outlet Temperature: 550°C / 1040°F
Core Outlet Pressure: 25 MPa / 3625 psia
To be able to compare the SCWR with similar 
Japanese/European studies, a lower core outlet 
temperature (510°C / 950°F) has been
considered in this investigation (with the option 
of increasing it if results of the analysis will 
allow it).  The purpose of these analyses is to 
verify whether these high performance design 
data are obtainable, or if any core design
concern will require a change in this design 
point.
For the core geometry, a tentative
configuration has been selected based on
preliminary studies by INEEL.  For a thermal 
spectrum core, the square lattice with solid
moderator “rod” arrangement shown in Figures 
30 and 31 has been selected.  Given the layout
of the moderator box, two different fuel
assembly configurations could have been
considered: 16x16 and 19x19.  For this
preliminary analyses a 19x19 fuel assembly was 
selected (19x19 assemblies are currently
foreseen for the APWR).  Given the very low 
Figure 30.  Preliminary Fuel Element Design 
Assembly (19x19).
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flow rate in the system due to the large
enthalpy rise in the core, 14-foot fuel rods 
(similar to the AP1000 design) have been
assumed as they allow for somewhat higher 
velocities given the same power density.
Fuel rods dimensions typical of PWRs
have been assumed, so that the main
geometrical innovation between the SCWR
and a conventional PWRs is in the reduced
pitch to diameter ratio: against a typical PWR 
value of 1.33, the pitch to diameter ratio
selected for the SCWR is 1.21 to reduce the 
flow area and allow for an increase in flow 
velocity and a more compact and therefore economical core layout.
The following geometrical dimensions have been estimated for the fuel assembly and element:
Fuel rod outer diameter 0.374 in. (9.50 mm)
Fuel pitch/diameter ratio 1.213
Pitch 0.452 in (11.48 mm)
Moderator box length 0.905 in. (22.99 mm)
Fuel rod length 14 ft (4.27 m)
Fuel assembly pitch 8.598 in ( 0.2184 m)
Interassembly pitch 0.040 in (open lattice) – 0.40 in (canned
assembly)
Fuel rods per assembly 217 (out of 361 positions)
Flow area (assembly) 20.6 sq-in (0.0133 m2)
Some other parameters have been estimated on the basis of conventional experience:
Core inlet pressure drop coefficient 144
Core outlet pressure drop coefficient 144
Power profiles See section 2.3
Fraction of power generated in the fuel 97.4%
It may be worth stressing that for the scope of this analysis the choice of a square versus hexagonal lattice 
is not important: what matters is the channel flow area for different configurations, or even better the 
moderator to fuel ratio in the core. 
Based on the three plant configurations: Direct Cycle, Integral Indirect Cycle, Loop Indirect Cycle, 
selected for further investigation (MacDonald et al. 2002), three different sets of inlet conditions have 
been considered for the core inlet temperature:
3 The P/D ratio has been calculated based to have a sufficient distance between rods for the fabrication of grid 
spacers, according to INEEL indication.
4 For the purpose of the present investigation and lacking a fuel assembly design, pressure losses have been 
concentrated at the core inlet (support plate, nozzles, lower grids) and core outlet (upper support plate, upper nozzle, 
upper grids, IFMs) and values based on common experience have been selected.
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Figure 31.  Preliminary Fuel Element Design 
Detail.
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• Core Inlet Temperature of 280°C.  This value represents a typical value for a direct cycle with a 
reasonable number of preheating stages.  It also allows for the severe density change connected to the 
transition to above critical temperatures (374°C)5 to be relatively far away from the channel inlet 
(however, the transition will be located in the core lower half even for the average channel).  Note 
that it is not possible  to push the pseudo-critical transition into the upper half of the core (as is done 
for BWRs for the transition from water to steam).
• Core Inlet Temperature 280-350°C.  Adoption of somewhat higher temperatures is possible for a 
direct cycle (where the in let temperature is not defined by preheating stages).  This would allow 
slightly higher flow rates with all the associated benefits (better heat transfer coefficients, more 
margin to DHF6 conditions).  However, this advantage is anticipated to be small, and there might be 
concerns of moving the transition region too near to the core inlet.  For these reasons the analyses of 
this option will not be performed in this stage of the study.
• Core Inlet Temperature 450-500°C.  The adoption of a very high temperature in a direct cycle is 
possible.  “Skipping” the pseudo-critical transition will allow achieving higher flow rates and more 
uniform flow conditions (the density changes will be much smaller).  The very low density of the 
moderator also makes the adoption of a fast core possible and further studies will be devoted to 
analyze this solution.  Even for a thermal core, the more uniform coolant density might help in the 
core design.  The drawbacks of this solution are 1) poorer heat transfer coefficients that will limit the 
linear power, and 2) the very low density of the fluid in the primary system that will increase the 
concern for LOCAs events.
3.2.  Core Design Criteria for SCWR
As discussed in our last quarterly (MacDonald et al. 2002), the Core Design Criteria for the SCWR 
are significantly different from those of a PWR, and in some aspects will be more similar to the criteria 
for liquid metal reactors.  Design requirements are defined for PWRs on the basis of the ANSI N18.2 
(ANSI 1973), and are summarized in Table 2:
Table 2.  ANSI Plant Conditions
ANSI plant 
conditions.
Description Effect on the Plant
Condition I :
Normal
Operation
Conditions accommodated with 
margins between plant parameters and 
values of parameters that would require 
automatic/manual protective actions
No fuel damage expected (MDNBR within 95/95 
rule). Limited fuel damage within capability of 
plant cleanup system. Plant capable of operation 
after limited corrective actions.
Condition II:
Incident of 
Moderate
Frequency
Conditions of moderate frequency that 
can be accommodated, at worst, with 
reactor shutdown.
Same as condition I
Condition III: 
Infrequent
Faults
Conditions of low frequency that will 
not ,by themselves, generate a 
Condition IV fault 
Small fraction of fuel rods can be damaged. 
Immediate resumption of operation may be 
precluded. Release of radioactive materials should 
not be sufficient to interrupt or restrict public use 
of those areas beyond the exclusion radius
Condition IV:
Limiting
Faults
Faults that are not expected to happen 
during the life of the plant but are 
defined as limiting faults against which 
the system must be designed
Must not cause a release of radioactive material 
that results in an undue risk to public health. 
Resumption of operation may be precluded
5 This transition closely resembles the liquid-vapor transition of subcritical water and, for simplicity, will be referred 
to as the ‘pseudo-critical transition’.
6 DHF= Deterioration Heat Flux
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As far as the Condition I (normal operation) events are concerned, the ANSI 18.2 requirements lead 
to the definition of Core Limits.  The Core Limits represent the loci of the thermal power, system 
pressure, and inlet temperatures at various pressures that satisfy the following criteria:
1. The MDNBR (Minimum Departure from Nucleate Boiling Ratio) is not less than the Safety
Analyses Limit DNBR (SAL-DNBR) (e.g. a MDNBR of 1.3 is typically considered with 
several different design DNB correlations).
2. The hot channel exit quality is not greater than the upper limit of the quality range for the 
applicable DNB correlation.
3. The vessel outlet temperature is lower than the saturation temperature.
The Core Limits define the area of acceptable core operation and bound the operating limits of the plant 
parameters.  As discussed in our last quarterly (MacDonald et al. 2002), the “Minimum departure from 
nucleate boiling ratio thus becomes the limiting parameter in core design, but simply because it is the best 
index of fuel cladding damage/failure”. Naturally, the SCWR presents a significant difference from
PWRs (i.e. no DNB can occur) and thus the core limits defined in the previous list lose significance and a 
new definition of the core design criteria are needed.
To define proper design criteria for the SCWR, the NRC Standard Review Plan (USNRC 2002), 
Section 4.2 “Fuel System Design” has been considered.  According to the NRC Standard Review Plan:
The objectives of the fuel system safety review are to provide assurance that (a) the fuel system is 
not damaged as a result of normal operation and anticipated operational occurrences, (b) fuel 
system damage is never so severe as to prevent control rod insertion when it is required, (c) the 
number of fuel rod failures is not underestimated for postulated accidents, and (d) coolability is 
always maintained.  "Not damaged," as used in the above statement, means that fuel rods do not 
fail, that fuel system dimensions remain within operational tolerances, and that functional
capabilities are not reduced below those assumed in the safety analysis.  This objective
implements General Design Criterion 10, and the design limits that accomplish this are called 
Specified Acceptable Fuel Design Limits (SAFDLs)[…]. […] Fuel rod failure is defined as the 
loss of fuel rod hermeticity […]7
The fuel system design bases for Fuel Damage, Fuel Rod Failure, and Fuel Coolability (that according to 
the previous paragraph are the main requirement for different plant conditions) are given in Tables 3, 4, 
and 5 and have been directly taken from the NRC Standard Review Plan.
As discussed above, the NRC Standard Review Plan requires that no fuel damage occurs during 
normal operation and anticipated operational occurrences, and indicates that in addition to precluding fuel 
rod failure, fuel damage criteria should assure that the fuel system dimensions remain within operational 
tolerances and that functional capabilities are not reduced below those assumed in the safety analysis.
Fuel system damage includes, therefore, fuel rod failure, but also imposes additional requirements
summarized in the NRC Standard Review Plan, Section 4.2-II-A-1 and summarized in Table 3.
As far as fuel rod failures are concerned, according to the NRC Standard Review Plan (section 4.2-II-
A-2):
7 Bold added to highlight relevant parts.
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Fuel rod failures can be caused by overheating, pellet/cladding interaction (pci), hydriding, 
cladding collapse, bursting, mechanical fracturing, and fretting.  Where applicable, the fuel rod 
failure criteria should consider high burnup effects based on irradiated material properties data.
Fuel rod failure criteria are required to address the potential failure mechanisms listed in Table 4 to be 
considered complete according to the NRC Standard Review Plan.  In particular, regarding the
overheating of cladding, the NRC Standard Review Plan states: 
[…] Although a thermal margin criterion is sufficient to demonstrate the avoidance of
overheating from a deficient cooling mechanism, it is not a necessary condition (i.e., DNB is not
a failure mechanism) and other mechanistic methods may be acceptable.  There is at present 
little experience with other approaches, but new positions recommending different criteria 
should address cladding temperature, pressure, time duration, oxidation, and embrittlement.
[…]
Table 3.  Design basis acceptance criteria for fuel system damage.
Fuel Rod Damage8 – Design Basis
Paragraph Acceptance Criteria Description (from SRP section 4.2-II-A-1)
(a) Stress, strain, or loading limits for spacer grids, guide tubes, thimbles, fuel rods, control 
rods, channel boxes, and other fuel system structural members should be provided.  Stress 
limits that are obtained by methods similar to those given in Section III of the ASME Code 
are acceptable.  Other proposed limits must be justified.
(b) The cumulative number of strain fatigue cycles on the structural members mentioned in (a) 
above should be significantly less than the design fatigue lifetime, which is based on
appropriate data and includes a safety factor of 2 on stress amplitude or a safety factor of 20 
on the number of cycles.  Other proposed limits must be justified.
(c) Fretting wear at contact points on the structural members mentioned in paragraph (a) above 
should be limited.  The allowable fretting wear should be stated in the Safety Analysis 
Report and the stress and fatigue limits in paragraphs (a) and (b) above should presume the 
existence of this wear.
(d) Oxidation, hydriding, and the buildup of corrosion products  (crud) should be limited.
Allowable oxidation, hydriding, and crud levels should be discussed in the Safety Analysis 
Report and shown to be acceptable.  These levels should be presumed to exist in paragraphs 
(a) and (b) above.
(e) Dimensional changes such as rod bowing or irradiation growth of fuel rods, control rods, 
and guide tubes need not be limited to set values (i.e., damage limits), but they must be 
included in the design analysis to establish operational tolerances. 
(f) Fuel and burnable poison rod internal gas pressures should remain below the nominal 
system pressure during normal operation unless otherwise justified.
(g) Worst-case hydraulic loads  for normal operation should not exceed the holddown
capability of the fuel assembly (either gravity or holddown springs).
(h) Control rod reactivity must be maintained. This may require the control Rods to remain 
watertight if water-soluble or leachable materials (e.g., B4C) are used.
8 The No-Fuel Damage criterion requires also that the no fuel rod failures requirements in Table 4 are satisfied.
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Table 4.  Design basis acceptance criteria for fuel rod failure.
Fuel Rod Failure – Design Basis9
Paragraph Acceptance Criteria Description (from SRP section 4.2-II-A-2)
(a) Internal Hydriding: Hydriding as a cause of failure (i.e., primary hydriding) is prevented by 
keeping the level of moisture and other hydrogenous impurities within the fuel very low 
during fabrication.  Acceptable moisture levels for Zircaloy-clad uranium oxide fuel should 
be no greater than 20 µg/g (20 ppm).  Current ASTM specifications for UO2 fuel pellets state 
an equivalent limit of 2 µg/g (2 ppm) of hydrogen from all sources.  For other materials clad 
in Zircaloy tubing, an equivalent quantity of moisture or hydrogen can be tolerated.  A 
moisture level of 2 mg H2O per cm of hot void volume within the Zircaloy cladding has been 
shown to be insufficient for primary hydride formation.
(b) Cladding Collapse: If axial gaps in the fuel pellet column occur due to densification, the 
cladding has the potential of collapsing into a gap (i.e., flattening).  Because of the large local 
strains that accompany this process, collapsed (flattened) cladding is assumed to fail.
(c) Fretting : Fretting is a potential cause of fuel failure, but it is a gradual process that would 
not be effective during the brief duration of an abnormal anticipated operational occurrence 
or a postulated accident.  Therefore, the fretting wear requirement in paragraph (c) of 
subsection II.A.1, Fuel Damage, is sufficient to preclude fuel failures caused by fretting 
during these transients.
(d) Overheating of Cladding: It has been traditional practice to assume that failures will not 
occur if the thermal margin criteria (DNBR for PWRs and CPR for BWRs) are satisfied.  For 
normal operation and anticipated operational occurrences, violation of the thermal margin 
criteria is not permitted.  For postulated accidents, the total number of fuel rods that exceed 
the criteria has been assumed to fail for radiological dose calculation purposes.
(e) Overheating of Fuel Pellets : It has also been traditional practice to assume that failure will 
occur if centerline melting takes place.  This analysis should be performed for the maximum 
linear heat generation rate anywhere in the core, including all hot spots and hot channel 
factors, and should account for the effects of burnup and composition on the melting point.
For normal operation and anticipated operational occurrences, centerline melting is not 
permitted.  The assumption that centerline melting results in fuel failure is conservative.
(f) Excessive Fuel Enthalpy: For a severe reactivity initiated accident (RIA) in a BWR at zero 
or low power, fuel failure is assumed to occur if the radially averaged fuel rod enthalpy is 
greater than 711 J/g (170 cal/g) at any axial location.  For full-power RIAs in a BWR and all 
RIAs in a PWR, the thermal margin criteria  (DNBR and CPR) are used as fuel failure criteria 
to meet the guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.77 (Ref. 6) as it relates to fuel rod failure.  The 
711 J/g (170 cal/g) enthalpy criterion is primarily intended to address cladding overheating 
effects, but it also indirectly addresses pellet/cladding interactions (PCI).  Other criteria may 
be more appropriate for an RIA, but continued approval of this enthalpy criterion and the 
thermal margin criteria may be given until generic studies yield improvements.
9 Paragraphs (a) to (c) address failure mechanism that are typically more limiting during normal operation; 
paragraphs (d) to (h) address failure mechanism that are typically more limiting during anticipated operational 
occurrences and postulated accidents and are typically addressed in the Safety Analysis part (chapter 15) of the 
Safety Analysis Report. 
35
Fuel Rod Failure – Design Basis9
Paragraph Acceptance Criteria Description (from SRP section 4.2-II-A-2)
(g) Pellet/Cladding Interaction (PCI): There is no current criterion for fuel failure resulting 
from PCI, and the design basis can only be stated generally.  Two related criteria should be 
applied, but they are not sufficient to preclude PCI failures.
1. The uniform strain of the cladding should not exceed 1%.  In this context, uniform 
strain (elastic and inelastic) is defined as transient-induced deformation with gage 
lengths corresponding to cladding dimensions; steady-state creepdown and
irradiation growth are excluded.  Although observing this strain limit may preclude 
some PCI failures, it will not preclude the corrosion-assisted failures that occur at 
low strains, nor will it preclude highly localized overstrain failures.
2. Fuel melting should be avoided.  The large volume increase associated with melting 
may cause a pellet with a molten center to exert a stress on the cladding.  Such a PCI 
is avoided by avoiding fuel melting.  Note that this same criterion was invoked in 
paragraph (e) to ensure that overheating of the cladding would not occur.
(h) Bursting: To meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.46 as it relates to ECCS performance 
evaluation, a calculation of the swelling and rupture of the cladding resulting from the 
temperature distribution in the cladding and from pressure differences between the inside and 
outside of the cladding should be included in the ECCS evaluation model.  Regulatory Guide 
1.157 provides guidelines for performing a realistic (i.e., best-estimate) model to calculate 
the degree of cladding swelling and rupture.  Alternatively, Appendix K of 10 CFR 50 
presents acceptable features of an evaluation model for predicting the degree of swelling and 
rupture in the Zircaloy cladding.
(i) Mechanical Fracturing: A mechanical fracture refers to a defect in a fuel rod caused by an 
externally applied force such as a hydraulic load or a load derived from core-plate motion.
Cladding integrity may be assumed if the applied stress is less than 90% of the irradiated 
yield stress at the appropria te temperature.  Other proposed limits must be justified.  Results 
from the seismic and LOCA analysis may show that failures by this mechanism will not 
occur for less severe events.
In conclusion, the acceptance criteria for the SCWR can be expressed as:
− Fuel Damage  (see Tables 3 and 4) will not occur during Condition I and II events .  A 
very small amount of fuel damage may occur, and this will be within the capability of the 
plant cleanup system and will be consistent with the plant design basis.
− The reactor can be brought to a safe state following a Condition III event with only a 
small fraction of fuel rods damaged.  The fraction of fuel rods damaged must be limited to 
meet the dose guidelines of 10CFR100 although enough fuel damage might occur to 
preclude immediate resumption of operation.
− The reactor can be brought to a safe state and the core kept subcritical with acceptable 
heat transfer geometry (Table 5, coolability) following transients arising from Condition
IV events .
These acceptance criteria, coupled with the content of Tables 3, 4, and 5 define a complete fuel system 
design basis for the SCWR (or for any other LWR).
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Table 5.  Design basis acceptance criteria for fuel coolability.
Fuel Rod Coolability – Design Basis
Paragraph Acceptance Criteria Description (from SRP section 4.2-II-A-2)
(a) Cladding Embrittlement: To meet the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, §50.46, as it relates 
to cladding embrittlement for a LOCA, acceptance criteria of 1204°C (2200°F) on peak 
cladding temperature and 17% on maximum cladding oxidation must be met.  Similar 
temperature and oxidation criteria may be justified for other accidents.
(b) Violent Expulsion of Fuel: In severe reactivity initiated accidents, such as rod ejection in a 
PWR or rod drop in a BWR, the large and rapid deposition of energy in the fuel can result in 
melting, fragmentation, and dispersal of fuel.  The mechanical action associated with fuel 
dispersal can be sufficient to destroy the cladding and the rod-bundle geometry of the fuel
and to produce pressure pulses in the primary system.  To meet the guidelines of Regulatory 
Guide 1.77 as it relates to preventing widespread fragmentation and dispersal of the fuel and 
avoiding the generation of pressure pulses in the primary system of a PWR, a radially 
averaged enthalpy limit of 1.17 KJ/g (280 cal/g) should be observed.  This 1.17 KJ/g (280 
cal/g) limit should also be used for BWRs. 
(c) Generalized Cladding Melting: Generalized (i.e., non-local) melting of the cladding could 
result in the loss of rod-bundle fuel geometry.  Criteria for cladding embrittlement in
paragraph (a) above are more stringent than melting criteria would be; therefore, additional 
specific criteria are not used.
(d) Fuel Rod Ballooning : To meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.46 as it relates to evaluating 
ECCS performance during accidents, burst strain and flow blockage caused by ballooning 
(swelling) of the cladding must be accounted for in the analysis of the core flow distribution.
Regulatory Guide 1.157 describes models, correlations, data, and methods that are acceptable 
for meeting the requirements for a realistic calculation of ECCS performance during a 
LOCA.  Alternatively, Appendix K to 10 CFR 50 presents acceptable features of a
conservative evaluation model to consider burst strain and flow blockage.
(e) Structural Deformation: Earthquakes and postulated pipe breaks in the reactor coolant 
would result in external forces on the fuel assembly.  Analytical procedures are discussed in 
Appendix A to the NRC Standard Review Plan and are applied to verify compliance to two 
principal criteria for a LOFA: (a) fuel rod fragmentation must not occur as a direct 
consequence of blowdown loads, and (b) the 10CFR50.46 temperature and oxidation limits 
must not be exceeded.  Also, control rod insertability must be satisfied.  For PWRs, if the 
combined loads on the assembly remain below a P(crit) value defined as the allowable 
crushing load in Appendix A.c to Section 4.2 of the Standard Review Plan, then significant 
deformation would not occur and no additional analysis would be required to meet this 
criterion.  If P(crit) is exceeded, then additional analysis will be required to demonstrate that 
deformation is not severe enough to prevent control rod insertion and fuel coolability.
Not all the different issues in Tables 3, 4, and 5 have to be addressed for our preliminary
investigation, and a limited set of design requirements (addressing in particular paragraph (d) in Table 3 
and paragraphs (d) and (e) in Table 4) can be defined.  The cladding temperature will have to be limited 
to prevent cladding overheating (par (d), Table 4) and excessive corrosion (par (d), Table 3).  Considering 
the cladding temperature as an alternative approach to DNB to evaluate cladding overheating allows 
defining the core limits for the SCWR presented in our last quarterly.  The proposed SCWR core design 
criteria are:
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{Criterion 1}. The MNCTD (Minimum Nominal Cladding Temperature Difference)10 is not less than 
the Design Limit MNCTD (DL-MNCTD) (a DL-MNCTD will have to be defined 
statically based on the heat transfer correlation uncertainties).
{Criterion 2}. The hot channel exit enthalpy is not greater than the upper limit of the enthalpy range for 
the applicable Heat Transfer correlation.
{Criterion 3}. The vessel outlet temperature is lower than the vessel design temperature.
Criteria 1-3 will be used to define the Core Limits for the SCWR, as the loci of pressure, core inlet 
temperature, and power that satisfy these three criteria.  Core Limits will be generated by calculatin g for 
each power level, from 20% to 118% (118% is the typical overpower limit for PWRs), and for each
system pressure, from the low pressure and high pressure trip setpoints, the maximum core inlet
temperature that satisfies the criteria.  This definition constitutes the core of the Reactor Protection 
System (that will be studied/designed in future activities).
Linear power will be limited on the basis of fuel melting considerations (par (e), Table 4).  According 
to the NRC Standard Review Plan: 
It has also been traditional practice to assume that failure will occur if centerline melting takes 
place.  This analysis should be performed for the maximum linear heat generation rate anywhere 
in the core, including all hot spots and hot channel factors, and should account for the effects of 
burnup and composition on the melting point.  For normal operation and anticipated operational 
occurrences, centerline melting is not permitted. […] The assumption that centerline melting 
results in fuel failure is conservative.
Therefore, a fourth design criterion can be added as: 
{Criterion 4}. Maximum Fuel Centerline Temperature in normal operation and anticipated transients: 
the fuel centerline temperature shall be below the melting point at 118% of nominal 
power (overpower limit) for all Condition I and II events.  The melting temperature 
should consider high burnup effects based on irradiated material property data.  This 
criterion imposes a limit on the maximum allowable linear power, which depends on the 
coolant temperature, power profiles and rod diameter.
Given the analogies between aspects of the heat transfer in the SCWR and liquid metal reactors, 
interesting insights may be obtained from considering the safety analyses of Liquid Metal Fast Breeder 
Reactors (LMFBRs).  For both applications a severe heat transfer deterioration phenomenon like DNB (or 
CHF for BWRs) does not exist, and a cladding temperature limit is used instead.  The LMFBR design 
requirements are established on the basis of the ASME Code Section III, Article NB-3112-3 (ASME
1974a and 1974b) and RDT standards (USERDA 1974a and 1976).  As discussed in Tang et al. (1978), 
RDT Standard C-16-1T (USERDA 1974b) defines allowable severity levels with respect to structural 
consequences for fuel components according to their likelihood of occurrence.  Table 6 (from Table 3-I in 
Tang et al. 1978) summarizes the design requirements and definition for LMFBR reactors.  In addition to 
these requirements, the General Design Criteria (USNRC) must also be satisfied.  Table 7 (from Graham 
et al. 1974) presents typical acceptance criteria for the different event categories for LMFBR fuel.  The 
analogies with Table 2 and with the NRC Standard Review Plan acceptance criteria discussed in Tables 3, 
4, and 5 are evident: what is interesting is that the acceptance criteria for LMFBR are expressed in a form 
more suitable to application to the SCWR, compared to PWRs or BWRs.
10 MNCTD is defined as the minimum value of the difference of the maximum allowable temperature and the 
cladding temperature as calculated in the analysis.  The Maximum Allowable Temperature will be discussed in the 
following section.
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The next section will discuss the definition of the two parameters that are needed to define the criteria 
here introduced: the Maximum Allowable Cladding Temperature (used in Criterion 1) and the Fuel 
Melting Temperature (used in Criterion 4).  Then, the focus will shift from the definition of core 
acceptance criteria to the verification of the required criteria.  In particular heat transfer correlations and 
models for supercritical water will be discussed and analyzed to verify the availability of the necessary 
correlations and data for at least preliminary evaluations of the SCWR core based on the just defined 
criteria.
Table 6.  Design requirements and definitions for LMFBR components (q.v. Table 3-I in Tang et al. 
1978).
Event Classification Severity Level
ASME Code Sec. III
(Article NB-3112-3)
RDT Standard
(RDT-C-16-1T)
RDT Standard
(RDT-C-16-1T)
Normal:
System startup/shutdown, 
design range operation, hot 
standby.
Operational Conditions:
Routine Steady State and 
transient conditions including 
normal startup, shutdown and 
operation of the plant as 
programmed.
Steady State Operation:
Design ranges of flow, temperature, power, 
and flux parameters.
Operational Transient:
Expected changes in parameters due to 
control or maintenance operation, no
damage or significant loss of effective 
component lifetime .
Upset:
Abnormal incident not causing 
a forced outage or causing a 
forced outage for which the 
corrective action does not 
include any repair of 
mechanical damage.
Anticipated Faults:
Off-normal condition 
(individual) that may be 
expected to occur once or 
more during plant lifetime.
Operational Incidents:
Occurrences where no significant loss of 
effective component lifetime occurs ,
unless failure of the component constitutes 
the initiating event.
Emergency:
Infrequent incident requiring 
shutdown or correction of the 
condition or repair of damage of 
the system; no loss of structural 
integrity.
Unlikely Faults:
Individual condition not 
expected to occur during plant 
lifetime, but collectively, 
events in this category may 
occur several times.
Minor Incidents:
Occurrence where component damage is 
within specified loss of effective lifetime; 
no lifetime reduction for permanent or 
semipermanent components for total 
number of occurrences in this class.
Faulted:
Postulated events and 
consequence where integrity 
and operability may be impaired 
to the extent that consideration
of public health and safety are 
involved.
Extremely Unlikely Faults:
Extremely low probability 
conditions that are not 
expected during plant lifetime 
but represent extreme or 
limiting cases of faults, 
identified as possible
Major Accidents:
Damage that requires replacement or repair 
of replaceable semipermanent components 
or system replacement, repair, or at least 
extensive inspection of permanent 
components.
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Table 7.  Classification of accidents and acceptance criteria (from Graham et al. 1974).
Level Event or 
Accident Class
Definition
Probability
(per Reactor Year)
Upper Limit 
Acceptance Criteria
1 Normal
Operation
Event that will normally 
occur:
• Full power operation
• Startup/shutdown
• Random fuel pin failure
1 Accumulated cladding 
strain <0.1%
(no significant loss of 
effective lifetime)
2 Anticipated
Transients
(Upset)
Unlikely Events
(Emergency)
Events that, based on 
experience, are expected to 
occur at least once during 
the plant lifetime.
Events that are not expected 
to occur individually, but 
that might, based on the 
number of such possibilities, 
occur once during the 
lifetime of the plant.
1 to 3 x10-2
3x10-2 to ~10-4
Accumulated cladding 
strain <0.3%
Accumulated cladding 
strain <0.7%
(Integrity limit, above 
this limit fuel cladding 
can fail)
3 Extremely
Unlikely Events
(Faulted
Hypothetical
Events
Events never expected to 
occur.
Design margins to provide 
for unforeseen events.
~10-4 to ~10-7 No loss of in-place
coolable geometry.
Interpreted for LMFBR
as:
• No clad melting and 
relocation
• No sodium boiling
3.2.1.  Temperature Limits For The Cladding And Fuel
As discussed in the previous section, to properly complete the definition of the core design criteria, a 
melting inception temperature for the fuel must be defined.  The melting temperature of unirradiated 
uranium dioxide is approximately 5080°F (Beaumont et al. 1978), but the melting temperature decreases 
by about 58°F per 10,000-megawatt days per metric ton of uranium burnup.  A typical limit for the peak 
fuel centerline temperature in 65,000 MWd/ton fuel for prevention of centerline melt is 4700°F.
Therefore, to satisfy Criterion 4 from the previous section, fuel melting must be prevented by
demonstrating that the peak fuel temperature, calcula ted at the hot spot and for overpower conditions 
(118% nominal power), is lower than 4700°F during all Condition I and II occurrences.
Also, cladding temperature limits have to be defined.  According to our preliminary material
considerations and based on the criteria defined in Table 7, the following limits have been defined:
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− Considering Tables 6 and 7, an additional limit (beyond the no fuel damage and no fuel rod failure 
requirements) can be added: no loss of effective lifetime is expected for Condition I events.  This is 
equivalent to requiring that the Cladding Temperature will be compatible with the desired core 
lifetime.  Thus the maximum allowable cladding temperature for Condition I events (MAT-I) must 
satisfy three distinct requirements: no fuel damage, no fuel rod failure and no loss of effective 
lifetime.  It is anticipated that corrosion concerns will define the MAT-I. Although the cladding 
material selection process is still under development, a preliminary estimate of the value for MAT-I
is 620°C.
− The requirement for Condition II Events is the same as the requirement for Condition I events (see 
Table 6, anticipated transients, except that the requirement on the effect on lifetime can be mitigated, 
since it is anticipated that the reactor will operate in these conditions only for limited period of times.
The requirement will still be “no significant loss of lifetime” but naturally corrosion concerns will not 
be an issue (limited extension in time).  Based on preliminary calculations at the INEEL, MAT-II has 
been defined as 800°C.
3.2.2.  Calculation of the Cladding Temperature: a Critical Review of 
Supercritical Water Heat Transfer Correlations
This section and the following one will focus on how the limits discussed above will be applied to
actual SCWR calculations.  The first issue that has to be solved is “how to calculate the cladding 
temperature” and therefore “which heat transfer correlation should be used for SCWR calculations”.  The 
selection of an appropriate correlation and a critical comparison of difference correlations is the objective 
of this section.
Before entering into a quantitative analysis of the different correlations, some preliminary qualitative 
considerations should be discussed.  No phenomena comparable to departure from nucleate boiling (for 
PWR and BWR) or dryout (for BWR) exist for SCWRs.  However, SCW presents a phenomenon known 
as Deterioration of Heat Flux or DHF: for high heat fluxes and low fluid velocities a significant 
deterioration in the heat transfer coefficient has been observed at temperatures near the pseudo-critical
temperature (where the heat transfer coefficients are much higher than at higher or lower temperatures).
An interesting discussion on DHF and the various correlations for predicting it is presented in Cheng and 
Schulenberg (2001) and in Cheng et al. (2002).  Deterioration of Heat Flux is a phenomena very different 
than the Heat Flux Crisis which may occur in PWRs and BWRs, not only from the point of view of the 
physics involved, but, most important, from the point of view of its onset and effects.
DHF is first and foremost a much milder phenomena: the deterioration in heat flux is relatively 
limited and thus leads to a limited increase in the cladding temperature.  Therefore, it is not a good design 
criteria, because it is not, by itself, an index of cladding damage.  Given the very wide range of 
temperatures in a SCWR reactor (and the fact that DHF may occur only in a limited temperature region 
around the pseudo-critical temperature) and the very low heat transfer rates at the higher temperatures, it 
is not possible to say that if DHF is excluded, than no cladding overtemperature will occur.  In other 
words, the mildness of the phenomena makes it unsuitable as the main and only design criterion for 
cladding temperature.
Moreover, not only is the phenomena mild, but it also has a very smooth onset, so that it is very 
difficult to define when DHF begins.  This is also the reason for the large differences between the 
different correlations used for predicting DHF, as correctly pointed out in Cheng and Schulenberg (2001).
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Due to these reasons (mild effects and smooth onset), this phenomenon is better considered in the 
heat transfer correlations, which should either include it in their formulation or define a map of operating 
conditions under which a post-DHF correlation should be used, rather then through specific DHF onset 
correlations.  This is the reason why no specific DHF based design criterion has been defined.  It is here 
suggested to retain DHF only as an index of potential problems: if the heat-transfer correlations that take 
into account this phenomenon (e.g. the Bishop and Oka-Koshizuka correlations introduced in the next 
section) the Minimum DHF Ratio (MDHFR) should only be calculated as a supporting parameter.  Even 
if the MDHFR is not needed as a design criteria, the penalization on heat transfer coefficient in DHF 
conditions is such (q.v. the results of the two correlations studied in the next section) that it will be wise 
to operate as far away as possible from DHF conditions, since this will guarantee better performance and 
core thermal-hydraulic design margins.
A typical correlation for DHF is the Yamagata (1972) correlation.  Cheng and Schulenberg (2001) 
suggest that it gives reasonably conservative values of the DHF when compared to other available 
correlations.
2.1200 GDHF ⋅=
where DHF is the deterioration heat flux in [W/m2] and G is the mass velocity in [kg/(m2s)].  Note that if 
the channel geometry is fixed, it is evident that the mass velocity in the Yamagata correlation is directly 
proportional to the linear power (or power density, which is equivalent) while the DHF is proportional to 
the mass velocity to a power greater than 1.  It is therefore evident that for supercritical water, given a 
fixed geometry, increasing the linear power will actually increase the MDHFR, thus increasing the core 
margins.
3.2.2.1.  Heat Transfer Correlations
Several Different correlations have been developed during the sixties and seventies for heat transfer 
in supercritical water.  Cheng and Schulenberg (2001) include a very thorough summary and comparison 
of the available correlations.  However, two considerations must be noted concerning all these
correlations:
1. All the correlations have been developed for heat transfer in geometries with flow inside tubes.
Experiments with tube bundles similar to the core of a SCWR have not been conducted.  Naturally, 
no correlation takes into account the effect of mixing vane grids, wire spacers, or other peculiarities 
of the core geometry.
2. The reliability of the correlations has to be verified.
Therefore, one of the more urgent tasks for development of SCWRs is to develop and validate appropriate 
heat transfer correlations.  It is important to note that if the criteria discussed in Section 3.2 are adopted, 
the interest will shift from DNB and CHF correlations of the type used in PWRs and BWRs, to cladding 
temperature.  Since the cladding temperature is determined by the heat transfer correlation, it is easy to 
understand that in the SCWR design the heat transfer correlation will replace the CHF correlations for 
determining the thermal-hydraulic margin and the safety of the system.  Extensive effort will be needed to 
develop valid correlations, replacing the expensive but fundamental DNB/CHF tests with similarly 
expensive heat transfer tests developed for the geometry of interest.
In analogy with a conventional LWR DNB analysis, a criterion similar to the 95/95 rule will have to 
be defined.  The limits for the DNB correlations are defined as the value of the DNB that guarantees, with 
a 95% probability at a 95% confidence, that DNB conditions will not occur.  Naturally the definition of 
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the correlation limit requires a detailed statistical analysis of the correlation data, and the same procedure 
will be required for the heat transfer correlations that will be used in the design of the SCWR.  (A 
discussion on the treatment of uncertainties and hot channel factors will be the focus of Section 3.2.3.)
In agreement with Cheng and Schulenberg (2001), the correlation published by Bishop et al. (1964) 
will be used for the analysis performed in this NERI project:
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Where the subscript b indicates bulk fluid properties and w indicates wall temperature properties.  Also, 
the recently developed Oka-Koshizuka (not included in the study described by Cheng and Schulenberg) 
correlation will be considered:
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Figures 32 and 33 show a comparison of the two correlations for the following conditions:
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Figure 34 and 35 show a comparison of the two correlations using the same conditions, but with a heat 
flux of 0.5 MW/m2.  The difference between the two cases is that the first case has a MDHFR of 0.8 (i.e. 
DHF is expected), while the second case has a MDHFR of 1.6 (DHF is not expected).  The purpose of 
this analysis was to verify the behavior of the two selected correlations in DHF and non-DHF conditions 
so as to verify if and how DHF was taken in consideration by the two correlations.
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The behavior of the two
correlations is in acceptable
agreement, especially considering the 
comparison of several other
correlations given by Cheng and
Schulenberg (2001), but differences
up to 40% in the predicted heat
transfer coefficient occur at some
temperatures.  Comparing Figures 32 
and 34, it is evident that the
agreement between the correlations
does not change significantly between 
the two cases (with and without DHF) 
and it therefore appears that both
correlations account for the DHF
phenomena in a more or less
analogous (at least quantitative) way.
The heat transfer coefficients
calculated in the critical temperature 
region by both correlations are
different for the cases with and
without DHF.  This seems to suggest 
that both correlations are in some way 
taking the DHF into account.  For the 
Bishop et al. correlation, a heat
transfer coefficient (Ht) less than half 
the value of the non-DHF value is 
calculated (non-DHF conditions
Ht=33.6 [KW/m2 C]; DHF conditions 
Ht=15.8 [KW/m2 C]; DHF to non-
DHF Ht ratio: 0.47).  For the Oka-
Koshizuka correlation, the heat
transfer coefficient calculated in DHF 
conditions is around 2.5 times lower 
than the coefficient calculated in the 
non-DHF case (non-DHF conditions 
Ht=33.3 [KW/m2 C]; DHF conditions 
Ht=13.23 [KW/m2 C]; DHF to non-
DHF Ht ratio: 0.40).  No effect due to 
the different DHF conditions is
evident outside the critical
temperature region, thus indicating that both correlations are appropr iately considering the effect of DHF 
(that is a phenomenon only present for temperatures near to the critical temperature).
From a qualitative point of view, it is interesting to note how the Oka-Koshizuka correlation 
calculates completely different heat transfer coefficients in the region around the critical temperature in 
the two cases: a peak in heat transfer coefficient in this region is present only in the non-DHF case 
(Figure 34).  No such peak is shown (Figure 32) in the DHF case and instead a deteriorated (i.e. lower 
than in the neighboring regions) heat flux is calculated in this region.
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Figure 32.  Heat transfer coefficients calculated with the 
Oka-Koshizuka and with the Bishop et al. correlations 
versus temperature at a heat flux of 1000 KW/m2 (DHF 
expected).
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Figure 33.  Percentage deviation of the heat transfer 
coefficients predicted by the Oka-Koshizuka correlation 
compared to the Bishop et al. correlation versus 
temperature, at a heat flux of 1000 KW/m2 (DHF expected).
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The Bishop et al. correlation does not predict a drop in the heat transfer coefficient near the pseudo-
critical temperature, but the quantitative difference between the case with and without DHF is analogous 
to that calculated with the Oka-Koshizuka correlation. 
Figure 34.  Heat Transfer coefficients calculated with the Oka-Koshizuka and Bishop correlations 
for different temperatures at a heat flux of 500 KW/m2, MDHFR=1.6
Figure 35.  Percentage deviation of the heat transfer predicted by the Oka-Koshizuka correlation 
compared to the Bishop correlation.  Heat flux of 500 KW/m2, MDHFR=1.592.
While this comparison of the different correlations in DHF and non-DHF conditions was missing in 
Cheng and Schulenberg (2001), it can be used to show that DHF appears to be considered in at least the 
Bishop et al. and Oka-Koshizuka correlations, and it would seem possible to eliminate Design Criterion 5 
(as discussed in Section 3.1.3) if these correlations are used.  Both correlations take into account DHF in 
an acceptable way, conforming to the expected physical behavior.  Also, Cheng and Schulenberg (2001) 
compared different correlations in a case where DHF was present, thus showing significant differences 
(for example) between the Dittus-Boelter correlation (that clearly cannot take DHF into consideration) 
and the Bishop et al. Correlation.  Figures 36 to 39 compare the heat transfer coefficients calculated by 
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the Dittus-Boelter correlation with heat 
transfer coefficients calculated by the
Bishop et al. and the Oka-Koshizuka
correlations (with and without DHF),
showing that the agreement between the 
Bishop et al. and Oka-Koshizuka
correlations and the Dittus-Boelter
correlation increases in the non-DHF
cases, thus demonstrating that the Bishop 
et al. and Oka-Koshizuka correlations
correctly predict better heat transfer
coefficients in non-DHF conditions.
Figures 36 and 37 demonstrate how 
the Bishop et al. correlation seems to take 
post-DHF heat transfer into
consideration, showing significant
differences between the two cases.  Also, 
a supplemental case with a MDHFR of 
3.184 was calculated to show the effect 
of increasing the margin from DHF
conditions.  The farther the system is 
operated from DHF, the better the
agreement between the Bishop et al. and 
the “ideal” Dittus-Boelter coefficient.
With a very large MDHFR the Bishop et 
al. correlation calculates better heat
transfer coefficients than the Dittus-
Boelter correlation.  (Please note that
different values of the MDHFR have
been obtained by simply changing the 
heat flux in each case, with all the other 
parameters constant.)  As expected, the 
effect of the DHF conditions is mostly 
limited to the heat transfer values around
the pseudo-critical temperature.  For high 
and low temperatures, the Bishop
correlation gives very similar results in 
the three cases.
Figures 38 and 39 shows the same comparisons for the Oka-Koshizuka correlation.  The behavior of 
the Oka-Koshizuka correlation is very interesting from a qualitative point of view, showing clearly the 
case with DHF conditions (no heat transfer peak, but rather a heat transfer deterioration) and the 
improvement in heat transfer for large values of the MDHFR.  It is interesting to note how both the 
Bishop et al. (Figure 36) and Oka-Koshizuka (Figure 38) correlations calculate a heat transfer coefficient 
higher that the one predicted by the Dittus-Boelter correlation for large MDFHRs (in Figures 36 and 38, 
the MDHFR=3.184 case).  Also, the agreement between the two correlations (Oka-Koshizuka and
Bishop) is maintained, and even improved, at large MDHFR values.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
300 320 340 360 380 400 420 440 460 480 500
Temperature [C]
H
t
[W
/m
2
s]
Dittus-Boelter
Bishop [MDHFR=3.184]
Bishop [MDHFR=1.592]
Bishop [MDHFR=0.796]
Figure 36.  Comparison of the heat transfer coefficients 
calculated with the Dittus -Boelter correlation and the 
Bishop et al. (Westinghouse) correlation for cases with 
different MDHFR. 
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cases.
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Figure 38.  Comparison of heat transfer coefficients calculated with the Dittus -Boelter correlation 
and with the  Oka-Koshizuka correlation for cases with different MDHFR.
Figure 39.  Percentile difference between the Oka-Koshizuka and the Dittus -Boelter correlations 
for different MDHFR cases.
3.2.2.2.  Supercritical Water Properties
Properties for supercritical water have been calculated using the NIST/ASME properties (Harvey et 
al. 1996).  Figures 40 to 43 show the behavior of the main properties used throughout this analysis.
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Figure 40.  Density and heat capacity as a function of temperature at 25MPa.  The very peculiar 
peak in heat capacity between 375 and 400°C is due to the transition over the pseudocritical 
temperature (~385°C).
Figure 41.  Enthalpy as a function of temperature at 25 MPa.  The large Enthalpy increase in the 
pseudocritical transition reminds the boiling transition in subcritical water, although on a much 
milder scale.
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Figure 42.  Conductivity as a function of temperature at 25 MPa.
Figure 43.  Density as a function of pressure and temperature in the supercritical region.
Supercritical water beyond the pseudocritical point behaves in very good agreement with the 
perfect gas law.
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3.2.3. Hot Channel Factors and Implementation of the Design Criteria
The design criteria introduced in Section 3.2.1 need to be verified for any fuel rod in the core.
Therefore the first step in the application of this design criteria is the identification of the power
distributions in the core:
− Radial Peaking Factor (F∆H,A): The SCWR is anticipated to present a very flat radial power profile, 
due to the strong density feedback effect linked to the large changes in density of the coolant along 
the channel.  While a typical radial power peaking design value for PWRs is 1.5-1.65, preliminary 
studies on the SCWR suggest that the radial power peaking will be around 1.25-1.26 (Cheng and 
Schulenberg 2001,Dobashi et al. 1998 and 2000) for the SCWRs.
− Local Peaking Factor (F∆H,L): The local peaking factors for the high temperature SCLWR-H have 
been estimated as 1.14 (Mukohara et al. 2000) to 1.16 (Dobashi et al. 1998 and 2000) depending on 
whether the density feedback is considered or not.  These peaking factors have been calculated for a 
hexagonal lattice with a 258 fuel pin and 30 water rod assembly.  Different possible geometries for 
both square and hexagonal la ttices have been summarized in (Cheng and Schulenberg 2002).  Grid 
spacers are considered.
− Axial Peaking Factor (FNZ): A rather typical axial peaking factor of ~1.58 has been proposed for the 
SCWR (Dobashi et al. 1998 and 2000). Axial power distributions for a supercritical water reactor 
have been studied by Koshizuka and are estimated to have a profile similar to a design cosine (Cheng
and Schulenberg 2002).
The Radial Peaking Factor defines the hot channel, the Local Peaking Factor identifies the hot rod in 
the hot assembly, while the Axial Power Profile identifies the location of the hot spot in the fuel rod.  The 
product of (F∆H,A)⋅(F∆H,L)⋅(FNZ) gives the maximum local heat flux on the surface of a rod divided by the 
average fuel rod heat flux.
The thus defined peaking factors allow for a proper definition of the hot spot and hot channel, but are 
not by themselves sufficient for an evaluation of the design limits defined in Section 2.  In fact, the impact 
of theoretical and experimental analysis uncertainties, instrumentation and control inaccuracies,
manufacturing tolerances, material properties and correlations uncertainties, and changes of reactor
conditions during the lifetime must be taken into consideration in predicting the thermal-hydraulic
performance to ensure that proper margins are provided to meet both lifetime and safety design limits 
with a sufficient degree of confidence.  A discussion on the treatment and nature of these uncertainties 
will be given in the following sections.
For example, the typical requirement for a PWR (having taken DNB as the principal index of clad 
damage/failure) is that there is an at least 95% probability with a 95% confidence that no DNB
phenomenon will occur in the core.  In its simplest application, the 95/95 rule has been applied by 
defining a Correlation Limit DNBR such that there is a 95% probability that DNB will not occur when 
the calculated DNBR is greater or equal than the correlation limit.  Calculations of the DNBR for the 
plant are then developed treating all parameters in a conservative way (nominal value plus uncertainty).
This approach is very conservative and more realistic, statistically based methodologies for the
application of the 95/95 rules have been studied and proposed by Westinghouse and approved by NRC 
(Chelemer et al. 1975, Friedland and Ray 1989).
An alternative approach has also been endorsed by the NRC in its Standard Review Plan: “For
DNBR, CHFR or CPR correlations, the limiting (minimum) value of DNBR, CHFR, of CPR is to be 
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established such that at least 99.9% of the fuel rods in the core would not be expected to experience 
departure from nucleate boiling or boiling transition during normal operation or anticipated operational 
occurrences.”
Since the main design criteria for the SCWR is not DNB but the cladding temperature, the situation is 
more similar to the LMFBRs and therefore an approach similar to that studied by Westinghouse for the 
Clinch River Breeder Reactor (CRBRP) will be considered here (see Carelli and Bach 1979, Carelli and 
Spencer 1976, Friedland 1980, and Tang et al. 1978).  On the other hand, some differences make the 
SCWR unsuitable for a strict application of the CRBRP methodology, and an intermediate approach 
between the CRBRP methodology and the PWR studies will have to be considered.  Section 2.3.1 will 
introduce the CRBRP methodology, while section 2.3.2 will discuss the reasons why this methodology is 
not entirely suitable for the SCWR and will propose a new approach.  It may be worth pointing out that an
approach very similar to that developed by Westinghouse for the CRBRP has been adopted in the 
Japanese studies on supercritical water reactors.
3.2.3.1.  Semi-Statistical Approach for the CRBRP
There are three possible approaches for combining uncertainty factors in the study of a nuclear reactor 
and in the verification of the required confidence in the acceptance criteria (for example for LMFBR that 
there is a 99.9% probability that no rods experience cladding temperatures above the acceptable value, 
appropriately defined). 
The cumulative method, using direct combination, represents the worst conditions.  It assumes all 
uncertainties have the most unfavorable value and occur at the same location and time.  This assumption 
is very conservative, and virtually ensures that at no point in the core will the limits ever be exceeded.
Such an approach causes a substantial decrease in the expected performance of the reactor, but given its 
simplicity it has been widely employed at the beginning of the nuclear era.  Given the high degree of 
conservativness and the penalty on the power associated to this approach, different statistical approaches 
were developed to treat the uncertainties in a more realistic way and to lower the burden on the plant 
performance.
A completely statistical method, in which all uncertainties are treated statistically, represents the 
most optimistic expectation.  By using this method, the hot channel / hot spot factor is not an absolute 
factor, but is a function of the confidence level.
An intermediate approach, developed by Westinghouse, is the so-called semi-statistical method.
This method was adopted as a reasonable compromise between cumulative and fully statistical methods 
and is commonly used in liquid metal reactor designs.  The method postulates that actually not all 
parameters are statistical in nature.  Therefore, the sum of uncertainties is divided into two principal 
groups: statistical and non-statistical sub-factors.  By calculating the total hot-spot factor for a certain
temperature rise, systematic uncertainties are treated cumulatively and statistical uncertainties are treated 
statistically.
The separation of the uncertainties into two principal groups is typical of the Westinghouse analytical 
procedure both for PWRs and for the LMFBR.  A non-statistical (or direct) uncertainty is defined as a 
variation in a design variable, which is known or conservatively assumed to occur, but is not included in 
the nominal analysis.  Computationally, the non-statistical factors represent multipliers applied to the 
nominal magnitudes of the variables to provide the worst value that might occur.  The direct factors are 
related to effects that are assumed to occur with certainty, for example measurement deadbands for 
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different variables, inlet flow maldistribution, direct bias, cladding temperature increases beneath the wire 
wrap (for LMFBR using wire wraps), etc.  A variable that has a random frequency distribution of 
occurrence is treated statistically.  For example, experimental data (such as materials properties) are 
treated statistically since there is a random error in their evaluation.  Other typical random effects are 
manufacturing variability of fissile fuel contents, dimensional tolerances, instrumentation uncertainties, 
and uncertainties in experimental data.
The nominal (without uncertainties) cladding inlet temperature can be expressed as: 
nomcaldnomfilmnomcoolnominnomgap TTTTT ,,,,, ∆+∆+∆+= (19)
where the heat transport path between coolant and cladding have been divided into three paths (coolant or 
enthalpy rise, film, and cladding).  In an analogous way if the fuel temperature is to be calculated:
nomfuelnomgapnomcaldnomfilmnomcoolnominnomcenterlinefuel TTTTTTT ,,,,,,, ∆+∆+∆+∆+∆+= (20)
and in general the temperature of each of the five zones can be expressed as:
∑
=
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where m is the index representing the fuel system component (for example m=3 for the cladding).  To 
calculate the value for each fuel component region including the value of hot channel and hot spot factors, 
the following expression is defined:
∑
=
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j
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,0, (22)
where Fj represent the total hot spot factor for component j and is defined as:
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F
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∆
−= − (23)
and F0 has been introduced to account for uncertainties also in the inlet temperature.  Considering also the 
uncertainties in inlet temperature and treating this as an additional fuel component, the temperature of 
component m can be defined as:
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If all uncertainties are treated as non-statistical or direct uncertainties (thus the semi-statistical
approach becomes a cumulative method), all the uncertainties are assumed to have the most unfavorable 
value and Fj is simply calculated on the basis of this model.  In a semi-statistical approach only part of the 
uncertainties are treated in a direct way, and the component m temperature can be expressed as: 
∑∑
==
∆−++∆+= m
j
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m
j
nomjnominm TFFTTT
0
,,,
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,, )1( (25)
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where statistical and direct parts of Fj have been highlighted.  How the different uncertainties are applied 
in the calculation of fuel rod temperature for the hot channel is shown in Figure 44. 
Figure 44.  Conceptual application of a semi-statistical method
And ∆Tj,dir = nomjdirjnomj TFT ,,, )1( ∆−+∆ (26)
The nominal temperature difference, ∆Tnom, is multiplied by the product of the direct hot channel 
factors to give the temperature rise including non-statistical factors, ∆Tdir.  Using this value, the nominal 
temperature is increased to Tdir or T0σ. Tdir represents the mean value about which the statistical 
uncertainties are applied.  The nominal channel can be any channel in the assembly, with the nominal 
channel coolant ∆T calculated using subchannel analysis codes.  In practice, the channel with the highest 
power density in the LMFBR is singled out for application of the hot channel factors.  According to the 
methodology illustrated in Figure 44, a temperature for the m component is calculated as Tdir by
considering in the calculation procedure (with subchannel analysis codes or other core T&H codes) the 
effect of the direct uncertaintie s (all accounted in a conservative way as previously discussed), and then 
the effect of statistical uncertainties need to be superimposed to this calculated temperature. 
To better explain the application of the statistical part of equation (25), some discussion of the 
treatment of statistical factors is warranted (q.v. Carelli and Spencer 1976, pages 3 to 12).  If a
temperature T can be expressed as a linear function of independent random variables (xi):
T= a0 + a1x1 + a2x2 + a3x3 + … + anxn (27)
Then the variance of T is equal to the sum of variances of the aixi’s
∑
=
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22 σσ (28)
It is important to note that even if the independent variables do not have a normal distribution, T will tend 
to approach a normal distribution as the number of variables grows.  The two fundamental assumptions at 
the basis of Figure 44 have already been introduced: (1) all the statistical uncertainty factors are assumed 
to be independent from each other, and (2) a normal distribution is assumed for all the uncertainty factors 
and for the overall variance of the temperature of component m.  If T is an arbitrary function of the 
independent variables it can be naturally approximated by a Taylor series around its mean value (Tdir from 
Figure 44, where all the variables are at their mean values, with no uncertainties) with negligible errors 
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provided that deviations from the mean value are small for each variable (as is the case with most hot 
channel factors):
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and if T has a normal distribution, than the probability that Tdir + 2σ will not be exceeded is 97.73%, and 
the probability that Tdir + 3σ will not be exceeded is 99.87%.
Therefore, the maximum temperature of a fuel component m, for example the cladding (m=3) with 
99.9% confidence level is:
σ3,,,,max, +∆+∆+∆+∆+= dircalddirfilmdircooldiriningap TTTTTT (31)
As mentioned above, the one fundamental assumption for this statistical uncertainties approach is that all 
the uncertainty factors have a normal distribution.  Regarding this assumption, the most commonly non-
normal distributions are rectangular distributions, typical for a variable such as a dimension with specified 
bounds.  For such a distribution, the bounds correspond to σ3± .  Therefore, if some of the variables 
have a rectangular distribution, than the 2σ or 3σ coverage discussed above will be greater (more
conservative) than if the distributions were all normal with the same standard deviation.
Tables 8 and 9 summarize the uncertainty factors for the CRBRP (from Carelli and Spencer 1976)
Table 8.  Direct uncertainty subfactors for cladding temperature evaluation.
Uncertainty Fact (i ) \      Component (j ) Coolant Film Cladding
Reactor Power Lever 1.03 1.03 1.03
Physics Modeling: 2D/3D 1.01 1.1 1.1
Physics Modeling: Axial Shape (Bias) 1.0 1.03 1.03
Inlet Flow Maldistribution 1.02 1.0 1.0
Flow Distribution Calculation Uncertainty 1.03 1.0 1.0
Pellet-Cladding Eccentricity 1.0 1.11 1.08
Cladding Thermal Conductivity 1.0 1.0 1.035
Combined Direct Factor 1.093 1.295 1.304
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Table 9.  Statistical uncertainty subfactors for cladding temperature evaluation (3σ).
Uncertainty Fact (i ) \      Component (j ) Coolant Film Cladding
Physics Experimental 1.055 1.055 1.055
Physics Modeling: Pin Interpolation 1.01 1.01 1.01
Physics Modeling: Axial Shape 1.0 1.01 1.01
Fissile Content 1.052 1.052 1.052
Inlet Flow Maldistribution 1.039 1.0 1.0
Flow Distribution Calculation Uncertainty 1.055 1.0 1.0
Wire Wrap Orientation 1.01 1.0 1.0
Subchannel Flow Area 1.019 1.0 1.0
Film Heat Transfer Coefficient 1.0 1.12 1.0
Pellet-Cladding Eccentricity 1.0 1.13 1.11
Cladding Thickness 1.0 1.0 1.08
Cladding Thermal Conductivity 1.0 1.0 1.075
Coolant Properties 1.017 1.0 1.0
Once the methodology is defined, the issue becomes the determination of the hot channel factors for 
the supercritical reactor: this will require both the definition of the different uncertainties and the
quantification of their effect on the cladding, film, and coolant ∆T.  As will be discussed in Section 3.3, 
due to the large enthalpy rise and to the fact that at the core exit limited changes in the overall channel 
enthalpy rise will lead to large changes in temperatures, limiting the coolant (often called the ∆H factor) 
direct and statistical factors becomes fundamental.  For subchannel analyses on a supercritical water 
reactor (the SCFR-H) Mukohara et al. (2000) has used a similar approach to calculate the hot channel 
factors for the SCWR and explore different solutions to limit the hot channel enthalpy rise factors11.
The application of this approach is very simple and might be clarified by an example.  If the 
following 0σ conditions (nominal values plus direct uncertainties) are considered:
Inlet Temperature = 300C
Coolant ∆T= 200C
Film ∆T= 30 C
Cladding ∆T= 20 C
And if only the statistical uncertainty in physics experimental results and modeling (the first three items 
of Table 9) are considered (i.e. assuming these are the only uncertainties) the 3σ confidence for the 
cladding temperature would be calculated by defining the 3σ temperature uncertainties from Table 9 and 
the nominal conditions given above as: 
11 Reference to different coefficients for the CRBRP is due to a reference in the Mukohara et al. (2000) paper to 
CRBRP coefficients from N. E. Todreas and M. S. Kazimi, “Nuclear Systems II,” Hemisphere Publishing 
Corporation, while the values in Table 7 and 8 are from the final thermal hydraulic performance report for CRBRP 
(Carelli et al. 1985).
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Coolant ∆T
[C]
Film ∆T
[C]
Cladding ∆T
[C]
TOTAL
Physics Experimental 11 1.65 1.1 13.75
Physics Modeling: Pin Interpolation 2 0.3 0.2 2.5
Physics Modeling: Axial Shape - 0.3 0.2 0.5
The Overall 3σ would be equal to ∑
=
n
i
i
1
2σ  and thus 3σ=13.98 C, and therefore the cladding temperature 
with a 3σ confidence would be 563.98 C, meaning that there is a 99.87% probability that the cladding 
temperature will be below 563.98 C.
3.2.3.2.  Semi-Statistical Approach for the SCWR
The approach discussed in the previous section and applied to the CRBRP and to other SCWR studies 
has the advantage of allowing a clear representation of the system uncertainties and thus allows the 
identification of the more significant areas in which a technical development leading to a reduction of 
uncertainties would have a significant effect on the thermal margin for the plant.  The standard procedure 
for the application of such a procedure would be (1) a thermal-hydraulic study of the core with a 
subchannel analysis code using nominal values for the plant parameters and operating conditions; (2) 
definition of the different hot channel factors that will have an influence in the calculation of the thermal 
margin and quantification (cladding temperature and fuel centerline temperature); and finally (3) 
evaluation of the effect of the 3σ deviation in each fuel component ∆T to compile a table as those (Tables 
8 and 9) presented in the previous section. 
However, while an approach that considers each hot factor separately is appropriate for LMFBRs, it 
would not be appropriate for a SCWR.  First of all, the Coolant ∆T would have to be replaced with a 
Coolant ∆H, given the fact that, due to the transition between subcritical and supercritical temperature, no 
direct proportionality between enthalpy and temperature exists.  In second place, the fundamental
assumption of the CRBRP methodology is that each effect can be considered separately: while this is true 
with a good approximation for a LMFBR, it is not true for the SCWR.  For these reasons, more recent 
methodologies developed for LWRs take into account the uncertainties in a more integrated way.  On the 
other hand, PWR methodologies are essentially focused on the calculation of the departure from nucleate 
boiling ratio, while the relevant thermal design parameters for the SCWR are more similar to the 
parameters (cladding temperature and fuel temperature) used for the CRBRP.
A different approach will therefore be used for SCWRs, combining the semistatistical method 
described above with the Westinghouse procedures for LWRs.  The first approach used by Westinghouse
for the design of PWRs was the Standard Thermal Design Procedure (STDP) in which all the
uncertainties where treated in a direct, cumulative way.  This approach is similar to the cumulative 
approach described in the previous section, with one important difference: given the complex interaction 
of the different uncertainty factors and their effect on the departure from nucleate boiling ratio (the only 
parameter of interest in PWR, rather than the need to calculate temperatures in different regions for
LMFBR) the uncertainty factors where not applied to the DNBR, but rather where directly considered in 
the calculation procedure of the MDNBR (for example, increasing the power by 3% and studying the core 
thermal-hydraulic response in those conditions).  It became evident later that not all the parameters should 
be treated in a direct way, but rather a statistical approach was more appropriate.  The Improved Thermal 
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Design Procedure, ITDP, was therefore developed, where direct uncertainty factors and hot channel
factors were directly accounted for in the thermal-hydraulic model of the core, while a more refined 
treatment was developed to treat the statistical uncertainty in input parameters (Cheler et al. 1975, 
Friedland and Ray 1989).  In the ITDP, probability distributions were defined for those parameters and 
sensitivity studies developed to verify their effect on the MDNBR.  .
An overview of the ITDP for PWRs and the evolution of an appropriate hot channel factor 
methodology for the SCWR will be developed in the next quarter, and a complete, semistatistical
approach will be developed, to define the SCWR principal design requirement that: 
“For Condition I and II events for the SCWR, there is an at least 95% probability with a 95% 
confidence that cladding overheating (MAT-I and MAT-II) does not occur”
That is the same criteria used for PWRs, except that in those reactors the limit is based on DNB and is the 
same for Condition I and II events, while for the SCWR two different cladding temperature limits have
been defined for the SCWR.  A simpler approach has been selected for the first phase of the thermal 
hydraulic design, with a direct treatment of the uncertainty factors similar to the Westinghouse STDP.
3.2.3.3.  Direct (Non-Statistical) Hot Channel Factors for the SCWR
For the SCWR, an approach for estimating the worst thermal-hydraulic conditions similar to the ITDP 
described in the previous section will be adopted.  A preliminary list of different hot channel factors 
proposed for the analyses and a discussion of how each factor will be treated (either direct or statistical) 
follows.  However, a direct, cumulative treatment of all the uncertainties will be employed in our 
preliminary analyses, both to simplify the analyses and to allow for comfortable design margins at this 
stage of the design.  This list of hot channel factors cannot be considered complete at this stage of the 
design, and the uncertainty values are only rough estimates, based on CRBRP and Westinghouse PWR 
experience.
♦ Plant Operating Parameters
− Reactor Power Level: a typical calorimetric error of 2% is considered.  For preliminary analysis 
this factor will be treated in a direct way, increasing the power level of the reactor by 2% for the 
calculation of cladding temperature.  This is, however, a parameter that is typically treated
statistically in PWRs, and therefore the same approach will be used once a proper methodology 
is defined.  A rectangular probability distribution should be assumed, and therefore a standard 
deviation of 1.2% ( 3/2 ) is calculated.
− System Pressure Distribution: The system pressure control system for the SCWR is not yet 
determined, and naturally a direct cycle would have a different behavior than an indirect cycle.
For an indirect system, the pressure is typically controlled by a pressurizer to +/- 30 psi (~200 
Kpa).  For the SCWR, the effect of this uncertainty should be small compared to PWRs (where it 
becomes important in DNB considerations), and therefore the same value is considered pending 
further investigation.  This parameter shall be treated statistically, present a rectangular
distribution, and would have a standard deviation of 17.3 psia (120Kpa). 
− Core Inlet Temperature: Calibration errors associated with the measurement of the inlet 
temperature are typically in the range of +/- 4F (2.22°C).  This uncertainty is treated statistically 
in PWRs, has a rectangular distribution and a standard deviation of 2.3°F (1.28°C).
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− Primary Coolant Flow Rate: Uncertainties in the flow prediction are typically treated in two 
different ways, distinguishing between direct and statistical components.  For preliminary
analysis it will be assumed that 95% of the nominal flow will be available to cool the core.  With 
the more detailed methodology, a first uncertainty will be applied directly, and the minimum 
measured flow (97%, defined as the minimum flow that must be confirmed by instrumentation to 
run the plant) will be considered in the model.  Also, a statistical uncertainty in measurement of 
2% will be considered, with a rectangular distribution and a 1.2% standard deviation.
− Core Bypass Flow: For our preliminary analyses and pending a definition of the bypass flow for 
the SCWR, the bypass flow will be treated as a direct factor, assuming that 6% of the total flow 
will be “lost” as bypass.  The bypass flow will have to account for several different effects like 
guide thimble tube cooling, flow in the baffle -former region, and flow used for head cooling.
− Inlet Flow Maldistribution: A typical 5% maldistribution is considered for the hot assembly.
For PWR this is typically treated as a direct uncertainty and is applied by reducing the inlet flow 
to the hot assembly by 5%, and increasing the flow of the most peripheral assemblies (so to 
minimize cross flow from the assemblies near the hot one) to maintain the same overall flow.
This uncertainty is more important for a canned assembly design: in an open core, the effect will 
tend to vanish along the channel due to crossflow from neighboring assemblies.
♦ Nuclear Hot Channel Factors
− Nuclear Enthalpy Rise Hot Channel Factor (Assembly and Local), Nuclear Axial Hot 
Channel Factor: As discussed in Section 3.2.3, an enthalpy rise hot channel factor NHF∆  of 1.45 
(1.16 times 1.25) and an axial nuclear hot channel factor NQF  of 1.55 peak-to-average- factor 
with an assumed chopped cosine profile have been preliminarily defined for the hot rod.  These 
values are assumed to be best estimate values, not accounting any uncertainty in core map flux 
measures.
− Engineering Enthalpy Rise Hot Channel Factor: EHF∆ accounts for flow conditions and 
tolerances on the hot channel.  It is composed of different coefficients, accounting for fuel rod 
variation in enr ichment, fuel rod variations in geometric dimensions, non uniform flow
distribution at the core inlet, redistribution between channels, and thermal diffusion exchange 
between adjacent channels.  Several of these effects are considered separately in other hot
channel factors (for example the inlet flow maldistribution factor, or the subchannel flow area 
factor) so that only the effect of rod-to-rod variation in enrichment is considered explicitly in this 
coefficient.  On the basis of the CRBRP studies (Tables 8 and 9) the fissile content uncertainty 
results in a local fission rate bounding uncertainty of +/- 3%, for which a rectangular distribution 
can be assumed with a standard deviation of 1.73 %.  For preliminary analysis this coefficient is 
applied by increasing the heat flux of the rods in the hot assembly by 3%.  It might be worth 
pointing out that the 5.2% factor given in Table 9 for the CRBRP is simply the 3σ limit for the 
distribution defined above.
− Physics Calculation Methods and Control Rods Effect: Uncertainties due to physics
calculational methods and control rod effects are applied directly as multipliers to the radial 
power profile peaking factors.  In agreement with CRBRP a 4% uncertainty is assumed.
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♦ Other Miscellaneous Coefficients
− Subchannel Flow Area: Lacking an analysis of the effects of rod bundle dimensional tolerances 
and fuel rod bowing during operation, the same uncertainty factor used for the CRBRP (Table 9) 
will be used.  This coefficient will be applied by reducing the flow area of all the subchannels in 
the hot assembly by 1.9% (for the CRBRP a direct correspondence between the hot channel 
factor for coolant ∆T and the reduction in flow area in the hot assembly can be assumed).  This 
factor will have to be defined on the basis of admissible tolerances on the moderator box, fuel 
rods, and guide thimbles. 
− Coolant Properties: This factor was considered in the CRBRP to account for differences in 
coolant properties between different sources.  For the SCWR, the ASME/STIM steam tables will 
be used, and no uncertainty allowance will be considered for the range of parameters
(temperatures up to 800°C).  We assume that the ASME data are sufficiently corroborated not to 
require the definition of uncertainty factors.  This might prove to be an overly optimistic 
assumption, especially considering the high temperatures that the cladding may reach, but based 
on our preliminary information, no uncertainty factor is defined pending further investigations.
− Heat Transfer Coefficient: This is a critical area, and the definition of appropriate correlations 
for heat transfer on the rod surface is essential.  Given the definition of the cladding temperature 
as the main thermal design parameter, a complete and detailed understanding of the heat transfer
phenomena in supercritical water will be necessary.  For the time being, and has discussed in 
Section 3.2.2, two correlations have been selected for preliminary analyses.  These correlations 
have however been defined for flow inside a tube, and the effects of the bundle geometry, shape 
of the flow channels (due to the presence of the moderator boxes), cold wall factors, and mixing 
grids are unknown and have to be assessed.  Since it is difficult to anticipate the effect of these 
different features lacking experimental data, a large uncertainty exists concerning the heat
transfer coefficients.  However, introducing a large uncertainty factor in the design would 
exceedingly penalize the project.  Since it is expected that (a) better correlations will be available
following experimental activities and (b) the above mentioned effects should lead to
improvements in the heat transfer coefficient, in the following study no uncertainty will be 
considered for heat transfer correlations (thus assuming that the calculated heat transfer
coefficient is overly conservative).
− Cladding Conductivity and Thickness: An uncertainty of +/- 5% on the cladding conductivity 
was assumed in the CRBRP.  This factor is supposed to account both for the effect of
uncertainties in property database and for the cladding thickness tolerances.  This factor will be 
applied for the SCWR to the cladding conductivity for the purpose of calculating cladding 
midwall temperature and fuel temperature.
− Thermal Diffusion Coefficient: Thermal mixing between different channels is represented in 
several correlations and subchannel analysis code in terms of a Thermal Diffusion Coefficient. A 
conservative estimate of the TDC that will be used for this analysis is TDC=0.038. 
Table 10 summarizes the hot channel factors that will be used for preliminary analysis on the SCWR 
using a direct treatment of the uncertainties.
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Table 10.  Hot Channel Factors and Uncertainties for SCWR analysis using the Direct Method
Hot Channel Factors and Uncertainties Value Application in a Direct Method
Best Estimate Peaking Factors
Radial Power Peaking Factor 1.25 Applied to the hot channel heat flux
Local Power Peaking Factor 1.16 Applied to the hot rod heat flux
Axial Power Peaking Factor 1.55 Chopped cosine
Plant Operating Parameter
Reactor Power Level 2% Power multiplied by 102%
System Pressure 200 KPa System pressure reduced by 200 Kpa
Core Inlet Temperature 2.22 C Inlet Temperature increased by 2.2 C
Primary Coolant Flow Rate 5% Flow Rate reduced by 5%
Core Bypass Flow 6% Flow Rate reduced by 6%
Inlet Flow Maldistribution 5% Flow Rate in the hot assembly reduced by 5%
Nuclear Hot Channel Factors
Engineering Enthalpy Rise Hot Channel Factor 3% Heat Flux in hot channel increased by 3%
Physics Calculational Methods 4% Radial Peaking Factor increased by 4%
Miscellaneous Coefficients
Subchannel Flow Area 1.9% Reduce flow area in the hot channel by 1.9%
Coolant Properties uncertainty --- ---
Heat Transfer Correlation uncertainty --- ---
Cladding Conductivity and Thickness 5% Decrease Cladding Conductivity by 5%
TDC 0.038 Used 0.038 for correlations and subchannel analysis
codes
3.3.  Temperature And Densities Profiles In The Average And Hot 
Channels For Different System Configurations
The procedure adopted in this study to analyze the SCWR thermal-hydraulic behavior has been
divided into several steps of increasing detail and complexity, to be better able to understand the physical 
behavior of the SCWR system.
First, an analysis of the temperatures and density profiles in the average and hot channels for different 
possible system configurations was completed.  Important parameters for this analysis are the core inlet 
and outlet temperatures and the option of canned assemblies versus an open lattice.  The results are not 
influenced by the specific channel geometry (rod diameter, pitch, and moderation ratios) or by heat 
transfer correlations.  The aim of this first phase is to analyze some characteristic of the system, highlight 
potential areas of concerns regarding the feasibility of the system and to provide density profiles to the 
neutronic design group.
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To develop this analyses a simplified code (SCWAT, SuperCritical Water Analysis Tool) has been 
developed.  This code will be used for further preliminary analysis on the SCWR and will be expanded in 
future investigations.  At this stage of the investigation only a simplified core analysis module (hot + 
nominal, average channel) and a correlation testing module (used for the analyses of section 1.4) have
been developed.  The hot channel has been simply calculated by applying to the average best estimate 
channel (calculated using nominal value for all parameters and considering no allowance for
uncertainties) the hot channel factors discussed in the previous section in a direct way.  (Note that the 
simplified code used is not a subchannel analysis code, and therefore gives no allowance for crossflow 
between channels.)  The average channel calculations provide a sufficient database of information for our
preliminary neutronic tasks, while the hot channel analyses were required to better understand the
physical feasibility of the proposed design points.  Please note that, as above mentioned, the average 
channel conditions are calculated with best estimate design values, neglecting uncertainties, and thus the 
term ‘average channel’ is used with a meaning different from the one often used in core design where it 
represents the average values for the fuel bundle studied, considering the uncertainty factors AND the hot 
channel factors in the correct way through a subchannel analysis code.
Since the aim of this activity was simply the evaluation of the temperature, enthalpy, and density 
profiles in the core, no further data are needed except for the hot channel factors, the system pressure, and 
the core inlet and outlet temperatures.  As discussed in Section 3.1, two different main cases have been 
studied.  Based on the results of the analysis, other options were then considered for each case.
CASE #1 CASE #2
Core Outlet Temperature 510°C 510°C
Core Inlet Temperature 280°C 450°C
Core Inlet Pressure 25 MPa 25 MPa
Radial Power Profile Peaking Factor 
(Hot Rod)
1.45 (1.25*1.16) 1.45 (1.25*1.16)
Axial Power Profile Chopped Cosine,
Peaking factor 1.55
Chopped Cosine,
Peaking factor 1.55
3.3.1.  Case #1 Direct/Indirect Cycle, Thermal Core, Inlet Core Temperature 
280°C
The first case to be considered is a direct/indirect cycle with a core inlet temperature of 280°C and a 
core outlet temperature of 510°C.  This set of parameters is analogous to the Japanese/European reference 
design points and is the
obvious choice for a direct
cycle with no recirculation
loops.
The main concern of this 
solution (from a core thermal-
hydraulic design point of view) 
is the huge enthalpy rise in the 
core.  Figure 45 shows the
enthalpy rise along the core for 
an advanced PWR (AP1000),
the ABWR and this
configuration.  As is evident
from Figure 45, the proposed 
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Figure 45.  Core enthalpy rise for different reactor concepts.
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configuration for the SCWR has an enthalpy rise that is an order of magnitude larger than PWR/BWR 
systems.  This peculiarity will present significant concerns both from the point of view of thermal-
hydraulic design and from the point of view of system operation and control.
Two different cases (open
lattice and canned assemblies)
have been considered, and the 
results (temperature and
density profiles along the
channel) are given in Figures 
46 to 50.  It must be stressed
that for the case of canned
assemblies a perfect flow
distribution (i.e. the flow into 
each assembly exactly matches 
the radial peaking factor so that 
all channels behave like the
average channel) has been
assumed.  Only the mal-
distribution uncertainty has
been accounted for the hot
channel.  This is an extremely 
optimistic assumption, since it 
is equivalent to assuming no
power shifts in the radial
profile during the life of the
plant.  This case is however
interesting as it allows us to
evaluate the effect of the hot 
channel factors in the system
when the radial peaking factors 
are eliminated.
Based on these results some
considerations may be drawn:
• Thermal Hydraulic Core 
Design.  As Figure 48
shows, even for the case
with canned assemblies
and ideal orificing, the hot 
channel factors are
sufficient to give a
difference of more than
190°C between the
nominal and hot channel.  This huge difference is due to the enthalpy rise in the core: given the fact 
that all perturbations affect the enthalpy rise in the channel, even small hot channel factors lead to 
huge difference in enthalpy and therefore in temperature, given the relatively low Cp at the high core 
outlet temperatures.  This effect is clearly shown in Figure 50: the enthalpy rise in the nominal 
channel is 1974 KJ/kg, while the enthalpy rise for the hot channel is 2553 KJ/kg.  The effect of the 
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Figure 46.  Temperature profiles in the average and hot channel for 
different radial power peaking factors.  (Open lattice)
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water rod/tube assumed. (Open lattice)
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hot channel factors is
therefore to increase the
enthalpy rise by 30%.  For 
other nuclear systems (like 
both PWRs and LMFBRs) 
this would roughly
translate in an equivalent 
effect on the temperature
rise, but for the SCWR,
due to the transition
through the pseudo-critical
region, there is no linear
relationship between
temperature and enthalpy
and the hot channel factor 
effects on the temperature 
are significantly larger: the 
temperature rise in the
nominal channel is 230°C,
while the same
temperature rise in the hot 
channel becomes 420°C,
with an increase in the
temperature rise of more
than 83%.  And, this
increase assumes an ideal 
orificing that exactly
matches the radial peaking 
factor at all times during 
the lifetime.
Since the design
criteria discussed before
must be verified for both 
the average channel and
hot channel, an effective
core thermal-hydraulic
design will require
significant reductions in
core outlet temperatures.
The case of an open lattice 
shows an unacceptable
core outlet temperature
(Figure 46) in the hot channel for any value of the radial power profile: in any case the outlet 
temperature is above the design criterion for the cladding material (Criterion No.1 in Section 3.1.2).
Even the canned assembly case (Figure 48) gives an unacceptable core outlet temperature above the 
cladding limit temperature.  Given these results, the feasibility of an open lattice core is extremely 
doubtful, and even if a canned assembly’s design is adopted, a significant reduction in core outlet 
temperature will be required, unless significantly lower hot channel coefficients are considered.  Also, 
given the large effect of the hot channel factors, a statistical treatment of these uncertainty
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Figure 48.  Temperature profiles in the average and hot channel for 
different radial power peaking factors.  (Canned assemblies)
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coefficients is recommend, even though it will be significantly more time-consuming than the 
conservative treatment of the uncertainties used in this study.
Figure 50.  Coolant enthalpy in the average and hot channel, no water rod/tube assumed. (Canned 
assemblies)
• System Control.  A large reduction in core outlet temperature will not by itself solve the issue of the 
large enthalpy rise: for a temperature reduction from 510°C to 450°C the enthalpy rise will change 
only from 1974 to 1720 KJ/kg.  This enthalpy rise will make the control and operation of the system 
problematic at best.  For example, for a change in flow rate of 5% the core outlet temperature will rise 
by 20-30°C.  For an analogous change in a PWR flow rate, the exit temperature will change only by 
1°C.  This will significantly reduce the area of admissible core operation, require extremely rapid 
controls, and lead to increased trip frequencies.
Note also that a strong point in support of the SCWR/Direct Cycle has been that “It greatly simplifies 
the BWR RPV by eliminating recirculation pumps, steam separators and driers”.  Actually, the same 
results could be obtained by designing a BWR for a once through cycle with superheated steam.
However, this is prevented by CHF (dryout) concerns that would require very low power densities, but it 
must also be considered that the BWR recirculating loop is a very important safety feature of the BWR 
system.  Since only a limited part of the core flow rate (for the ABWR around 14-15%) is actually send to 
the turbine, a large water inventory is maintained in the recirculation loop of the BWR, and therefore even 
following a Loss of Feedwater, a large water inventory is available to remove decay heat.
No such possibility is available for the once-through SCWR system: on a loss of feedwater, no 
coolant will be available to the core to remove decay heat.  Feedwater will thus have to be maintained 
through the system, and the injection system will have to be much faster than in BWRs (and at a much 
higher pressure).  This will make the design of a passive direct cycle SCWR problematic, and this will be 
discussed further in the design relative tasks.  As will be discussed further in more appropriate documents, 
it is doubtful that the elimination of the BWR recirculation system and the adoption of a once-through
system will overall be a strong advantage of the SCWR in direct cycle.  Quite naturally, this concern and 
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the huge enthalpy rise in the core are strictly connected and are both due to the adoption of a once-
through direct cycle.
This safety concern coupled with the previously discussed issues (controllability, average to hot 
channel differences) connected to the huge enthalpy rise in the core, are very serious issues to be 
considered before the feasibility of a once-through system can be demonstrated.  In conclusion, the 
proposed reference temperatures do not allow for a feasible core design.  The following options can be 
considered:
Option 1: maintain an open lattice.  An open lattice will require a large reduction in the peak 
temperature.  Also, a subchannel analysis code will have to be developed to study the effective 
temperature/density profiles in the lattice to verify the beneficial effects of cross flow.  Even with a 
significant reduction in average outlet temperature, the large differences between the hot and average 
channel will create significant concerns regarding the possibility of designing a core with these
conditions. Control and Operation will be extremely complex as previously discussed.  The feasibility of 
this solution is extremely doubtful.
Option 2: adopt canned assemblies.  Canned assemblies will allow the adoption of higher
temperatures, differences between hot and average channel will be smaller, development of subchannel 
analysis code can be postponed.  However, the core enthalpy rise will still be very large, thus leading to 
the same control issues.  Moreover, the possibility of designing for a perfect orificing will have to be 
assessed based on the radial peaking factor evolution during the fuel cycle.  Moreover, the very large 
difference in density between core inlet and outlet (a factor of 2-3 larger than in BWR) will lead to 
significant parallel channel instability issues that will have to be addressed.  Even in this case, the average 
core outlet temperature will have to be significantly reduced to be compatible with the cladding 
temperature criterion: a SCWR with a core outlet temperature of 510°C does not look feasible with the 
given requirements for the cladding temperature, and a reduction at least to 450°C is suggested.  A 
statistical treatment of the uncertainties should be adopted as soon as possible, given the large effect of 
the hot channel factors on the design of the system.  The penalty for the SCWR associated with the use of 
conservative, direct methods is larger than compared to PWRs, and therefore a statistical method should 
be used for all further investigations.
One important thing is however to be considered: all the preceding analyses assumed a more or less 
complete lack of thermal-hydraulic and neutronic design interaction.  While this is a good assumption for 
PWRs, the same is not true for the SCWR: given the large changes in enthalpy above the critical 
temperature, and the effect that the changes in density will have on the design, it will be necessary to 
develop any further analyses by coupling the neutronic and thermal-hydraulic design.  This will naturally 
not solve any problems connected to the large core enthalpy rise, but should at least help achieve a more 
flat radial power distribution and strong damping factors for any hot-channel factor.  However, the 
neutronic-thermal hydraulic coupling is limited by the adoption of a solid moderator (the same effect 
would be obtained with water rods) that tends to limit the effect of the lower densities at high
temperature, by providing for an always available source of moderating atoms.
3.3.2.  Case #2 Indirect Cycle and Inlet Core Temperature of 450°C
In an indirect cycle approach, the selection of the core inlet temperature is more open.  This may 
allow for a reduction in the core enthalpy rise and thus the issues discussed in the previous section.  In 
particular, two different scenarios can be anticipated:
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Thermal Core :  Increasing the core inlet temperature moves the large density shift associated with 
the transition around the pseudo-critical temperature even nearer to the core inlet than in the cases
discussed above.  This will have the positive effect of making the density more uniform along the 
channel, but on the other way will require an even more important introduction of some sort of 
moderating material (either in the form of solid moderator rods, or with a water tube solution).  Our study 
of this solution will be postponed until a neutronic study has been performed and some preliminary 
feasibility issues have been addressed.
Fast Core :  On the other hand, operating the system in indirect cycle completely in the supercritical 
region should make the adoption of a fast spectrum solution more easily achievable without requiring 
very small pitch to diameter ratios in the core.  This solution will also result in a very small core enthalpy 
rise.  Issues connected to this solution are:
1. Given the very low densities, operating at low enthalpies rise will require very high flow 
velocities.  For example, operating with the same enthalpy rise as in a PWR will require the 
velocities in the SCWR core to be about 8 times larger than in PWRs.
2. A system like the proposed one will have a very low water inventory in the primary system, 
thus creating safety concerns that are more similar to the ones for a high pressure gas reactor 
than for a LWR.
3. Since the system will be very similar to a gas reactor, the natural question becomes “why 
would a SCWR design with its very high pressures and corrosive coolant be more interesting 
than a gas reactor?”  The answer is not clear, and it looks that this solution holds little interest 
compared to a gas cooled reactor design.
All in all, this solution has significant feasibility (high velocities, cost) and safety (extremely low 
inventory, very high pressure) issues.  Even if these can be solved, the prospects for competitive power 
generation with this solution look dim (comparison with a gas reactor).
Figures 51 and 52 show 
the temperature and density 
profiles for this solution in
an open lattice (no or ificing).
The discontinuities in the
temperature and density
profiles are due to the steam 
table implemented in the
code: only properties for
discrete values of the
pressure (22, 23, 25, and 26 
MPa) have been generated.
Therefore, there is a
significant change in
properties at the transition
between the different
pressure “regions” that
impact the numerical
solution.  Given the limited 
interest for this high
temperature, high velocity
solution no effort has been
devoted at this time to
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Figure 51.  Temperature profiles in the average and hot channel for 
different radial power peaking factors, with no water rod/tube for 
moderation, an open lattice and a core inlet temperature of 450°C.
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develop a more complete steam table for the SCWAT code.
Figure 52.  Coolant Density in the average and hot channel with no water rod/tube for moderation, 
an open lattice, and a core inlet temperature of 450°C.
3.4.  RELAP5 Code Improvements for Supercritical Applications
(INEEL)
The RELAP5-3D (INEEL 2002) computer program is being improved for analysis of supercritical 
light water reactors.  Our first quarterly (MacDonald et al. 2002) described modifications that allowed the 
code to simulate slow transients for a wide range of supercritical conditions.  Blowdown transients have 
now been simulated and are described below.
A series of 85 blowdown calculations were performed based on the geometry of the Edwards pipe 
experiment (Edwards and O’Brien 1970).  This experiment simulated a pipe pressurized with water that 
was blown down to the atmosphere through a large, fast-opening hole in one end of the pipe.  Although 
the experiment was performed at subcritical conditions, the initial pressure was changed to 25 MPa for 
this evaluation.  The initial temperature varied from 500 K to 800 K.  Eight of these 85 problems 
encountered water property failures and did not run to completion with the existing code.  The failures 
generally occurred near the pseudo-critical temperature point.
Several code updates were implemented to correct the code execution failures.  One change was to 
modify the interfacial heat transfer coefficient for vapor near the critical point.  Changes were also made 
to the extrapolations for metastable states near the critical point.  Modifications were also made to the 
transport properties of thermal conductivity and viscosity to eliminate discontinuities as the temperature 
changed from supercritical to subcritical.  The modified transport properties were based on the 4th edition 
of the 1967 ASME steam tables (Meyer et al. 1979).  The combined code modifications now allow all 85 
modified Edwards pipe blowdown calculations to run to completion.  Figures 53 and 54 show the 
pressure and break mass flow rate for the case with initial conditions of 25 MPa and 647 K.
60
70
80
90
100
110
120
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2
Distance from Core Inlet (fraction of total core length)
D
en
si
ty
[k
g/
m
3]
Nominal Channel
Hot Channel 
67
An existing pressurized water reactor
model, known as typpwr from the RELAP5-
3D assessment library (Carlson et al. 1990), 
was modified so that the initial conditions 
were supercritical on the primary side of the 
reactor.  The modified model had an initial 
pressure of 25 MPa and initial temperatures 
ranging from 583 K to 704 K on the primary 
side.  The modified model was run
successfully using the modified code through 
a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) initiated by 
a small break.  Figures 55 and 56 show the 
primary system pressure and break mass flow 
rate for this small-break LOCA calculation.
The modified code can now represent
transients that pass near the critical point.
Although the code ran successfully near the 
critical point, at times it ran slowly.  This 
problem is currently being investigated.
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Figure 53.  Pressure during a blowdown of Edwards 
pipe.
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Figure 54.  Break flow rate during a blowdown of 
Edwards pipe.
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Figure 55.  Primary system pressure during a small-
break LOCA.
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Figure 56.  Break flow rate during a small-break LOCA.
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Task Activity Description Year 1 Year 2 Year 3
Task 1
1.1 Reactivity Swing Analysis
1.2 Actinide Discharge and Isotopic Evaluation
1.3 Reactivity Coefficient Calculations
1.4 Peaking Factors and Reactor Control
Task 2
2.1 Identification of Most Promising Materials (MIT)
2.2 Design and Construction of an Out-of-pile
Supercritical Water Test Facility (U-Mich)
2.3 Corrosion and Stress Corrosion Cracking
Behavior of Candidate Materials (U-Mich)
2.4 Radiation Stability of Candidate Alloys (U-Mich)
2.5 Modeling of Corrosion and stress Corrosion
Cracking in Supercritical Water (U-Mich)
Task 3
3.1 Conceptual Design of the Reactor Coolant
System (Westinghouse)
3.2 Definition of the Thermal/Mechanical Design
Limits
3.3
Core Thermal-hydraulic Design (Westinghouse)
3.4 Evaluation of Coupled Thermal-
hydraulic/Neutronic Oscillations (INEEL)
3.5 Plant Configuration and Operation
(Westinghouse)
3.6 Establish the Conceptual Design of Required
Safety Systems and Define their Performance
Parameters (Westinghouse)
3.7 Analysis of Anticipated Transients and Potential
Accidents (INEEL)
3.8 Conceptual Layout of Reactor Containment,
Fuel Handling, and Auxiliary Buildings
(Westinghouse)
3.9 Economic Analysis (Westinghouse)
Fuel-cycle Neutronic Analysis and Reactor Core Design
(INEEL)
Fuel Cladding and Structural Material Corrosion and
Stress Corrosion Cracking Studies (University of Michigan, MIT)
Plant Engineering and Reactor Safety Analysis
(Westinghouse and INEEL)
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Appendix A – Thermal-hydraulics of the SCWR Core with 
Moderator Boxes
In this appendix simple  calculations are presented to support the thermal feasibility of the core 
geometry used for the neutronic analysis of Section 2.  The geometry is that of Figure 4.  Table A.I 
reports the main input data for the calculations.  Note that with the assumed pressure and inlet/outlet 
temperatures the thermal efficiency of the system is estimated to be about 42.5% [Oka and Koshizuka 
2000], which is deemed acceptable.  In Table A.I the radial power depression is defined as the ratio of the 
lowest-to-average fuel-assembly power, and its importance will become apparent later in the analysis.  It 
is assumed that the flow rate in the fuel assemblies is adjusted by means of orifices to maintain the 
average outlet temperature of 450°C throughout the core.  Note that the average power density is 
comparable with that of a PWR (i.e., 105 kW/L) and is much higher than that of a BWR (i.e., 54 kW/L).
Table A.I.  Input data for the thermal calculations.
Parameter Value
Fuel UO2, 95% TD
Pin OD 9.6 mm
Cladding Thickness 0.57 mm
Cladding Material Alloy 718 (high-Ni alloy)
Fuel Pin Pitch 11.616 mm
Pitch-to-Diameter Ratio 1.21
Moderator Box Side Length 23.232 mm
Moderator Box Thickness 0.57 mm
Cell Hydraulic Diameter 5.133 mm
Cell Flow Area 312.74 mm2
Active Fuel Length 4.27 m (14 ft)
Core Inlet/Outlet Temperature 280 / 450°C
Operating Pressure 25 MPa
Average Fuel Pin Power 100 kW
Average Power Density 96.4 kW/L
Average Linear Heat Generation 23.4 kW/m
Radial Power Peaking 1.3
Radial Power Depression 0.6
Axial Power Peaking 1.57 (=π/2 from cosine profile)
Peak Linear Heat Generation 47.8 kW/m
Two constraints are used in the analysis.  First, the peak cladding temperature in the core should 
remain below 620°C at 100% power.  It was shown by Hattori et al. [2000] that the mechanical and 
corrosion properties of Alloy 718 at this temperature are compatible with long-term operation in a 
supercritical-water environment.  This conclusion is also confirmed by Viswanathan and Bakker [2000] 
for high-Ni alloys in general.  The second constraint is that the fuel centerline temperature remain below 
the melting point of irradiated UO2 at 112% power.  The melting point for irradiated UO2 is 2600°C,
recommended by Todreas and Kazimi [1990].
To calculate the cladding temperature, we make use of the following equations:
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(z)q'
dz
dh
m =& (energy conservation) (A.1)
)TH(Tq bw −=′′ (Newton’s law of cooling) (A.2)
where m& is the fuel assembly flow rate, h is the coolant enthalpy, q' is the fuel assembly linear heat 
generation rate with a cosine axial profile, q" is the heat flux at the fuel pin surface (calculated from q' by 
means of obvious geometric considerations), H is the heat transfer coefficient, Tw is the wall temperature 
and Tb is the bulk temperature.  The heat transfer coefficient is calculated with the Oka-Koshizuka’s (O-
K) correlation [Koshizuka and Oka 2000], which was specifically developed for SCWR applications, 
accounts for the deterioration and enhancement of heat transfer phenomena characteristic of supercritical 
fluids, and was validated with experimental data for supercritical water.  The O-K correlation consists of 
the following equations:
y0.85Pr0.015ReNu = (A.3)
qf
DHF
81000
0.69y c ′′+−= (A.4)



+×−
−×−
+×
=
−
−
−
1.3/DHF109.7
0.65/DHF108.7
0.11/DHF102.9
f
7
8
8
c
4000kJ/kgh3330
3300kJ/kgh1500
1500kJ/kgh0
≤≤
≤≤
≤≤
(A.5)
DHF = 200⋅G1.2 (A.6)
where DHF is the deterioration heat transfer flux in W/m2 and G is the mass flux in kg/m2s.  Use of the O-
K correlation is recommended for the following range of the parameters: G=1.00-1.75 Mg/m2s, q" =0.0-
1.8 MW/m2 and Tb=20-550ºC.
The axial coolant and cladding temperature profiles for the peak-power fuel assembly (1.3 peaking) 
are illustrated in Figure A.1.  It can be seen that the peak cladding temperature constraint is met with a 
large margin.  However, the most severe temperature conditions for the cladding occur in the fuel 
assembly of lowest power, which in our case is also that of lowest flow rate.  This is because the heat flux 
at which the heat transfer coefficient drops is proportional to the coolant flow with an exponent greater 
than unity (see equation A.6).  Figure A.2 shows the axial coolant and cladding temperature profiles for 
the lowest-power fuel assembly (0.6 power depression).  The cladding temperature is indeed higher than 
in the peak-power fuel assembly, nevertheless the 620ºC constraint is still met with a margin of about 
13ºC.
To calculate the fuel centerline temperature at 112% power, we shall assume that the peak cladding 
temperature at this power level is 840ºC in accordance with the transient limit specified by Ishiwatari et 
al. [2002] for their SCWR design with high-Ni alloy fuel cladding.  The peak linear heat generation rate at 
112% power is 47.8×1.12=53.5 kW/m.  The thermal conductivity of Alloy 718 at the temperatures of 
interest is about 20 W/m⋅K [Allvac 2002].  Then, the temperature drop across the cladding is 54°C.
Assuming a cold gap conductance of 2×104 W/m2K [Todreas and Kazimi 1990], the temperature drop 
across the gap is about 50°C.  Therefore, the fuel surface temperature is 944°C.  The value of the thermal 
conductivity integral of the fuel is 53.5/(4π)=4.26 kW/m.  Using the thermal conductivity data for 95% 
TD UO2 fuel from Todreas and Kazimi [1990] combined with a surface temperature of 944°C, the 
centerline temperature is estimated to be about 2570°C, which meets the no-fuel-melting constraint.
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Figure A.1.  Temperature profiles in the fuel assembly of highest power.
Figure A.2.  Temperature profiles in the fuel assembly of lowest power.
Finally, it is important to estimate the maximum operating temperatures of the ZrHx moderator, which 
are used in the feasibility study of Section 3.  A temperature distribution exists within the moderator 
because of neutron and gamma heating.  For the purpose of this calculation we shall assume that all fast 
neutron and gamma energy (or about 10.3% of the total energy released by a fission event [Todreas and 
Kazimi 1990]) is deposited in the moderator.  This is a very conservative assumption especially with 
regard to the gamma energy deposition, which will in fact mostly occur in the heavy and high atomic 
number uranium fuel.
Considering that there are 5 fuel pins for each moderator box and that the peak linear heat generation 
rate in the fuel pin is 47.8 kW/m, it is possible to estimate the peak linear heat generation rate in the 
moderating box as 47.8×5×0.103=24.6 kW/m.  Then the heat flux at the moderator box outer surface is 
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about 265 kW/m2.  For this value of the heat flux the O-K correlation yields a heat transfer coefficient of 
about 12 kW/m2K, so the temperature at the moderator box outer surface is 450+265/12∼470°C.  The
thermal conductivity of Alloy 718 at the temperatures of interest is 15 W/m⋅K [Allvac 2002].  Then the 
temperature drop across the moderator box wall is about 10°C.  Allowing for an additional 10°C contact-
resistance drop between the moderator box wall and the ZrHx, the moderator surface temperature
becomes 490°C.  Assuming a ZrHx thermal conductivity of 15 W/m⋅K (see Section 3.1) and
approximating the square box with a cylinder, the temperature drop within the ZrHx is
24600/(4π×15)∼130°C, resulting in a peak centerline ZrHx temperature of 620°C.
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Appendix B: Nomenclature
Cp Heat Capacity [KJ/kg C]
Dh Hydraulic Diameter [m]
G Mass Velocity [kg/m2s]
H Specific Enthalpy [KJ/kg]
Ht Heat Transfer coefficient [KW/m2 C]
L Channel Length
Nu Nusselt Number
P Pressure [MPa]
P/D Pitch-over-Diameter Ratio
Pr Prandtl Number
Q” Heat Flux [W/m2]
Re Reynolds Number
T Temperature [C]
λ Conductivity [W/m C]
µ Viscosity [Pa-s]
ρ Density [kg/m3]
∆h Enthalpy difference [KJ/kg]
Subscripts
B Bulk temperature properties
W Wall temperature properties
In Core Inlet value
Out Core Outlet value
Acronyms
ABWR Advanced BWR
Bishop Bishop correlation
BWR Boiling Water Reactor
CHF Critical Heat Flux
DHF Deterioration Heat Flux
DNB Departure from Nucleate Boiling
FFP Fossil Fuel Plant
LMFBR Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor
MNCTR Minimum Nominal Cladding Temperature
Ratio
MDNBR Minimum DNB Ratio
MDHFR Minimum DHF Ratio
OK Oka-Koshizuka correlation
PWR Pressurized Water Reactor
SCWR SuperCritical Water Reactor
SRP Standard Review Plan (NUREG-0800)
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